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In United States v. Leon' the Supreme Court announced a "good-faith
exception" to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for "searches con-
ducted pursuant to warrants."'2 The Court's decision drew objections from
three justices in two dissenting opinions,3 and since its appearance" has
provoked primarily critical scholarly reactions.' If an unmistakable token
of skepticism respecting the Court's reasoning were required, the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court surely provided one by holding that the Leon result
violated the state constitution."
This Article defends the Leon result, but criticizes the justification of-
fered in the Court's opinion. After recounting the development of the
"good-faith exception," I consider two species of objections to the Leon
holding. One type of objection, which I shall refer to as categorical, criti-
cizes the Burger Court for denying the defendant's personal right to ex-
clusion.7 In my view, this objection misconceives the relationship between
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1. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). In a companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424
(1984), the Court refused to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant that failed, due to a good-
faith error, to particularize the items to be seized. This Article focuses on the more common situation
presented by Leon, in which the police have failed to establish probable cause but the warrant issues
nevertheless.
2. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
3. Id. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting in an opinion joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 3446 (Stevens,
J., dissenting in Leon and concurring in Sheppard).
4. Prior to the Court's decision, commentary was sharply divided. For opposition to the good-faith
exception, see, e.g., Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOWA L.
Rav. 551 (1984); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PIrr. L. REv. 307, 333-61 (1982); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70
GEO. L.J. 365 (1981); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development
and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365,
1399-1403 (1983). For support, see, e.g., Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith Restatement of the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916 (1982); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if
the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736 (1972).
5. See C. WHrrEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.03, at 6-9 (Supp. 1984); Alschuler, "Close
Enough for Government Work". The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 309;
LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifica-
tions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895; Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold:
But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98
HARV. L. REV. 87, 115 n.56 (1984).
6. Stringer v. State, No. 54,805, slip op. (Miss. Feb. 27, 1985) (en banc).
7. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3434-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the
Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than on an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
Living with Leon
Fourth Amendment rights and the exclusionary sanction. A second objec-
tion, which I shall refer to as analytical, accepts the Court's characteriza-
tion of the exclusionary rule as a judge-made remedy whose application
depends on a balancing of costs and benefits, but maintains that the Leon
majority badly misapplied this prudential calculus.8 This objection, I sub-
mit, ignores the constraints on unreasonable searches imposed by the costs
of the warrant process, costs that probably surpass the risk of exclusion as
a disincentive to abusive search warrants. 9
Although agreeing with the Leon result, this Article condemns the
Court's reasoning. Even if unlawful searches will not increase as a result
of the good-faith exception for warrant searches, and even if the exclu-
sionary rule is a deterrence-based remedy, the Leon majority has with-
drawn that remedy in a class of cases for which no other remedy is availa-
ble. In effect, Leon does less to effect an exception to the exclusionary rule
than to substitute a procedural for a substantive definition of probable
cause; probable cause within bounds of plain error is whatever a magis-
trate says it is. The Court's treatment of the deference due an issuing
magistrate as a remedial rather than a substantive question has every ap-
pearance of a cynical maneuver intended to obscure the substitution of
current judicial preferences in place of the values of the Framers, a cen-
tury of unanimous precedent, and the status of the Constitution as the
supreme law of the land.
But even this failure on the part of the Leon Court is curable. If the
Court were to admit that the "good-faith exception" amounts to a proce-
dural approach to the probable cause question, the inexorable tension be-
tween the existence of a constitutional violation and the absence of institu-
tional regret would disappear; the Court's rule would achieve its objectives
by declaring the police conduct in question legal, rather than irremedia-
ble. The costs of the warrant process would continue to provide a stronger
check on speculative searches than the exclusionary rule. A process-based
approach to probable cause would be at least as reasonable as the rule
holding an indictment or arrest warrant determinative of the issue of
probable cause to arrest.10 A plain-error limit on the deference due the
magistrate would prevent abuse of the warrant process. The Leon regime,
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81
MICH. L. REv. 1273 (1983).
8. See LaFave, supra note 5, at 903-11. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens made similar
arguments in their dissenting opinions. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3440-46 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 104
S. Ct. at 3453-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. It follows that the good-faith exception has no place outside the warrant context, a context
which provides unique intrinsic indicia of reliability about proposed searches. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 193-204.
10. See infra notes 150-89 and accompanying text.
The Yale Law Journal
even now taking form in the lower courts, effects these same systemic con-
sequences, but at the cost of ceasing to speak honestly about the Constitu-
tion. The probable cause approach could achieve the Court's political
objectives without surrendering so profound a jurisprudential virtue.
I. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
Almost as soon as Mapp v. Ohio" imposed the exclusionary rule on the
states in 1961, critics began to argue that the rule should not apply to
cases in which the police had "reasonable cause to believe there was rea-
sonable cause."' 2 For two decades the Court refused to recognize any such
exception, reasoning that if "subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the
discretion of the police."' 8 Leon's departure from this position is explica-
ble only in the context of growing judicial discontent with the exclusion-
ary rule, as expressed in an increasingly flexible balancing approach to
the rule's application.
A. United States v. Calandra and the Cost-Benefit Approach to
Exclusion
Little dispute surrounds the purposes of the Fourth Amendment: the
Framers intended to prohibit general searches unsupported by probable
cause. 4 But little agreement exists respecting the purposes of the exclu-
sionary rule, which remains the primary remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations. The Supreme Court's current approach, however, was clearly
set out in 1974, in the seminal case of United States v. Calandra.'5
In Calandra the Court, reversing two lower courts that had refused to
compel a grand jury witness to answer questions based upon evidence
seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights,'" distinguished the
exclusionary remedy from the constitutional rights protected by the rule.
Justice Powell wrote for the majority:
The purpose of the exclusionary rule. . . is to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth
11. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 952
(1965).
13. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964).
14. See T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-44 (1969) (dis-
cussing founders' antipathy toward general warrants unsupported by probable cause).
15. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
16. See In re Application for Immunity of John P. Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ohio
1971), affd sub nom. United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
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Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . In
sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.
1
"
The Court reasoned further that, "[a]s with any remedial device, the ap-
plication of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 8 Based on a "balancing
process implicit in this approach,"19 the Court proceeded to "weigh" the
"injury to the . . . functions of the grand jury against the potential bene-
fits of the rule as applied in this context." 20 Finding the deterrent benefits
of exclusion "speculative," the Court concluded that any such benefit
could not justify "substantially impeding the role of the grand jury. '21
Since Calandra, the Court has applied this balancing approach to per-
mit the use of illegally seized evidence in civil proceedings,
2 2 for impeach-
ment purposes in criminal trials, 23 to support a state conviction against a
petition for federal habeas corpus,24 and against any person except the
search victim in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
25
Given the Court's basic approach, the argument for the good-faith ex-
ception is superficially strong. When the police believe their actions to be
legal, the threat of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is not likely to
affect their behavior. 26 By contrast, the costs of exclusion-freeing the
guilty-are as obvious in good-faith cases as they are in any other context.
By the early 1980's, after a series of decisions restricting the exclusionary
rule's application based on the balancing approach, and with the Fifth
Circuit already adopting the good-faith exception,27 approval of the excep-
tion by the Supreme Court seemed all but inevitable. The case for a good-
faith exception was weakened, however, by a Supreme Court decision
modifying, not the exclusionary rule, but the substantive standard for de-
termining the existence of probable cause.
17. 414 U.S. at 347-48 (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 348.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 349.
21. Id. at 351-52.
22. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976).
23. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980).
24. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976).
25. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 & n.3
(1978).
26. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("When law enforce-
ment personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the
evidence they have seized is later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent effect.").
27. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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B. The Good-Faith Exception: Take One
Illinois v. Gates28 arose from an anonymous letter to the Bloomingdale,
Illinois police department, received on May 3, 1978. The letter stated that
Lance and Sue Gates were professional drug dealers; that on May 3 Sue
would drive the family car to Florida to be loaded with drugs; and that
Lance would fly down a few days later to pick up the car.29 Subsequent
police investigation revealed that Lance had made reservations to fly toWest Palm Beach on May 5; that upon arrival he went to a motel room
registered to Sue Gates; and that the couple left the motel at seven o'clock
the following morning, driving northbound on an interstate highway that
could have taken them back to Illinois. 0 Based on this information, the
Bloomingdale police obtained a warrant to search the Gates' Illinois resi-
dence and automobile. The search warrant was executed upon the Gates'
arrival, and the police discovered 350 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of
their car, as well as weapons and additional drugs in their home. 1
The Illinois courts suppressed the evidence, 2 holding that, standing
alone, the anonymous tip was insufficient to establish probable cause, and
that the observations of the police could not cure this deficiency because
all the police could corroborate was innocent activity. 3 The Supreme
Court granted the state's petition for certiorari," ' which raised one ques-
tion: "Whether detailed information provided to police by an anonymous
informer, coupled with government corroboration of the information, pro-
vide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant?""8
Prior to argument on this issue, the state moved to modify its petition
for certiorari to incorporate the question whether, assuming the warrant
application failed to establish probable cause, "the evidence [should] nev-
ertheless be admitted at trial because the police acted in a reasonable good
faith belief in the validity of the warrant."3" The Court denied the motion
and heard argument only on the probable cause issue.3 7 But after argu-
ment, the Court, over three dissenting votes, ordered reargument on the
good-faith issue.3"
28. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
29. See id. at 225.
30. See id. at 226.
31. Id. at 227.32. People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749-50, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980), affd, 85 Il. 2d 376, 423
N.E.2d 887 (1981).
33. See 85 Il1. 2d at 384-89, 423 N.E.2d at 890-93.
34. Illinois v. Gates, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982).35. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for the State of Illinois at 1, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213(1983).
36. See Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Amend or Enlarge Question Presented for Review, Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
37. Illinois v. Gates, 455 U.S. 986 (1982).
38. Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982).
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The Court's inclination to decide this question collided with serious
procedural obstacles. Since the state had not raised the good-faith issue in
the Illinois courts, resolution of a federal question not considered below
raised a serious doubt about the statutory basis of certiorari jurisdiction.
The absence of any trial court findings on good faith created a substantial
prudential reason for deferring resolution of that issue.39 Moreover, the
possible existence of an independent state ground for the decision below
indicated that the issue should be remanded, for the Supreme Court of
Illinois had applied the exclusionary rule since 1923-thirty-eight years
before Mapp v. Ohio.10
So, "with apologies to all,' ' 41 the Court, speaking through Justice
Rehnquist, declined to pass upon the good-faith question, consideration of
which the Court itself had ordered sua sponte. Instead, the Court decided
the original question raised in the state's petition for certiorari and held
that the warrant application had established probable cause. In so doing,
the Court abandoned the two-pronged test announced in Spinelli v.
United States and Aguilar v. Texas, under which an informant's tip could
establish probable cause only when the warrant application established
both the informant's reputation for veracity and her basis of knowledge in
the particular case.42 Under Gates, an informant's veracity and basis of
knowledge constitute only relevant elements in "the totality of the circum-
stances.' 4 Probable cause, the Court emphasized, is a "fluid," 44 "practi-
cal, nontechnical conception,'4 5 "not readily, or even usefully, reduced to
a neat set of legal rules."'46 The Fourth Amendment thus requires only
that the warrant application convince the magistrate that "a fair
probability" exists that the proposed search will yield evidence or contra-
band.' 7 And given the "great deference" owed to issuing magistrates by
reviewing courts,48 all that is needed to sustain the magistrate's decision to
issue a search warrant is a "substantial basis" for finding this "fair
probability.' 49 Applying this approach to the instant case, the Court con-
cluded that taken together the anonymous tip and the police information
39. Gates, 462 U.S. at 221.
40. See People v. Brocamp, 307 Il1. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
41. 462 U.S. at 217.
42. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114
(1964).
43. 462 U.S. at 233.
44. Id. at 232.
45. Id. at 231 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
46. 462 U.S. at 232. The Court continued: "Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such
diversity." Id.
47. Id. at 238.
48. Id. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 419).
49. 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
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tending to corroborate it established probable cause for the magistrate to
issue the warrant.5
The Gates decision seriously disturbed the justification for a good-faith
exception. How often could a reviewing court hold that the issuing magis-
trate lacked a "substantial basis" for finding a "fair probability" that evi-
dence would be discovered by the search, but the police justifiably enter-
tained a "reasonable good-faith belief" that the warrant application
established probable cause?"' The Leon Court overcame this obstacle by
ignoring it, thereby casting serious doubt on the concern for procedural
regularity expressed in the Gates opinion.
C. The Good-Faith Exception: Take Two
Leon involved a federal prosecution based on evidence obtained by the
Burbank, California police department pursuant to a search warrant is-
sued by a state superior court judge. An affidavit by an Officer Rombach
in support of the warrant application based probable cause on a tip from
a confidential informant and a plethora of corroborative police observa-
tions consistent with the tip but not of themselves compelling evidence of
crime. 52
The informant told Rombach, on August 18, 1981, that persons known
as Armando and Patsy were selling drugs from their residence at 620
Price Drive in Burbank, and that five months before, the informant per-
sonally had observed a drug transaction during which Patsy had sold five
hundred methaqualone tablets. The informant claimed to have seen on
this occasion a shoebox belonging to Patsy containing between fifty and
one hundred thousand dollars in cash. According to the informant, Ar-
mando and Patsy kept most of their cache at another location, and dealt
smaller quantities from the Price Drive residence.
The Burbank police began an extensive investigation to follow up on
the tip. On August 19, police observed automobiles registered to Armando
Sanchez and Patsy Stewart at the Price Drive residence. A records check
indicated that Stewart had no criminal history, but that Sanchez had been
50. 462 U.S. at 241-46. For a critique both of the totality-of-the-circumstances test and of the
result in Gates, see I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMEND-
MENT § 3.3, at 192-201 (Supp. 1986); Kamisar, supra note 4, at 552-84. For a defense of the Gates
standard, see Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465 (1984).
51. See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 588-89 ("How could the officer have had a 'reasonable, good
faith' belief that probable cause existed if it turns out that the totality of circumstances did not add up
to even a 'substantial chance of criminal activity'?").
52. See Joint Appendix 34-52, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (reproducing Of-
ficer Rombach's affidavit). The following discussion summarizes the affidavit.
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found with twenty thousand dollars in cash at the Miami airport in 1977
and had been arrested in Miami in 1978 for possession of marijuana.
On August 24, police observed a vehicle registered to Ricardo DelCas-
tillo arrive at the Price Drive residence. A Latin male left the automobile,
entered the house, and returned ten minutes later carrying a paper bag.
DelCastillo had been arrested in January 1979 for possession of fifty
pounds of marijuana while attempting to board a flight to Los Angeles.
DelCastillo's probation records indicated that he worked for an Albert
Leon. Leon's record included arrests in 1979 and 1980 for narcotics viola-
tions. When police contacted a woman who had accompanied Leon at the
time of one of the previous arrests, she refused to offer any information
for fear that she might be killed by the "Cuban Mafia" in which she
believed Leon to be involved. The Burbank police learned from a neigh-
boring department that a confidential informant had indicated that Leon
kept several thousand Quaalude tablets at his residence. At the end of
August, Leon evidently moved to a house at 716 South Sunset Canyon in
Burbank.
On both August 25 and August 26 the police observed individuals ar-
rive at the Price Drive location, enter and return with a bag or box a few
minutes later. One individual could not be identified because his vehicle
was leased, but the other drove a pick-up truck registered to Thomas Kil-
burn, an individual arrested in 1974 for possession of hashish and cultiva-
tion of marijuana.
On August 28, police surveillance observed that DelCastillo's car was
driven from the Price Drive residence to a Los Angeles condominium
unit. Later the same day, Sanchez drove his automobile from the Price
Drive location to Leon's residence on Sunset Canyon and returned with a
small package.
On September 8, police engaged in surveillance in an unrelated narcot-
ics investigation observed Patsy Stewart drive to the residence under ob-
servation. A woman emerged from the residence, entered Stewart's auto-
mobile, and returned to the house a minute later carrying a small paper
sack. The occupants of the house were arrested later that day for an unre-
lated purchase of amphetamines.
Shortly after midnight on the morning of September 19, police observed
a car registered to Sanchez parked by Leon's Sunset Canyon residence.
The same automobile was later observed at the Price Drive location. Of-
ficers subsequently drove to the Los Angeles condominium, and for the
first time observed interior lights on there; the utilities for the condomin-
ium were registered to Patsy Stewart, but there was no telephone service.
Two days later, police observed Sanchez' vehicle parked outside the
condominium.
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Officer Rombach sought the search warrant on September 21. At that
time the facts supporting probable cause included the informant's tip, now
six months old, and a month-long pattern of contacts among Leon,
Sanchez, and DelCastillo, all with narcotics records, and Stewart, who
had made the apparent delivery to persons subsequently arrested on nar-
cotics charges. Officer Rombach offered his professional opinion that the
Los Angeles condominium served as the group's "stash pad," the separate
location at which the informant had said most of the drugs would be
stored. Based on this information, the judge issued a warrant to search the
Price Drive residence, Leon's residence on Sunset Canyon, the Los Ange-
les condominium, and the vehicles of Stewart, Sanchez, Leon, and Del-
Castillo. The searches uncovered four pounds of cocaine and more than
1,000 Quaaludes from the condominium, nearly a pound of cocaine from
Leon's residence, and an ounce of cocaine from the Price Drive residence.
Indicted on federal drug charges, the defendants interposed a motion to
suppress. The district court granted the motion with respect to each of the
defendants having standing to object to searches of particular premises; the
district court viewed the tip as stale or nearly stale, and the subsequent
corroboration "as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt."5 The gov-
ernment took an interlocutory appeal, and prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Gates, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, Judge Kennedy dissent-
ing.5" In both the district court and the court of appeals, the government
urged recognition of a good-faith exception. Neither lower court accepted
the argument, but the district court after an evidentiary hearing found as
a fact that the police had acted in good faith. 5 Conceding for purposes of
its appeal the absence of probable cause, the government sought, and the
Supreme Court granted, certiorari on the good-faith issue.56
Again the Court faced a procedural obstacle in deciding the good-faith
issue. The Ninth Circuit had affirmed the suppression order" over a
strong dissent5" before the Gates opinion set out the relaxed "totality-of-
the-circumstances" test for probable cause. Under Gates, the search war-
rant at issue probably would withstand a motion to suppress. Indeed, the
warrant application in Leon made a much stronger showing of probable
cause than the application in Gates.59 Applying the Gates test, any re-
53. United States v. Leon, No. Cr. 81-907 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 1982) (unpublished ruling) (re-
printed in Petition for Certiorari 9a, 10a, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)).
54. United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. See Petition for Certiorari at 14a.
56. United States v. Leon, 462 U.S. 1206 (1983).
57. See Petition for Certiorari at Ia.
58. See Petition for Certiorari at 5a.
59. In the first place, the informant in Leon was not unknown to the police, but simply confiden-
tial. Second, the informant clearly satisfied the basis of knowledge prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test,
see supra text accompanying note 42, because the Leon informant alleged personal observation of a
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viewing court would be hard pressed to "presume innocent conduct when
the only common sense explanation for it is on-going criminal activity."'
This time, however, there would be no apologies. Noting no more than
that consideration of the good-faith issue is "within our authority, which
we choose to exercise,"61 a six-justice majority adopted the exception in an
opinion by Justice White. The Court began by deploying the now-
familiar balancing approach:
Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a
particular case, our decisions make clear, is "an issue separate from
the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct." Only the
former question is currently before us, and it must be resolved by
weighing the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence ob-
tained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neu-
tral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.6 2
With the issue stated in this way, the Court had little difficulty concluding
that exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially valid warrant
fails to deter Fourth Amendment violations.
Confronted by overwhelming empirical evidence confirming the rule's
negligible cost in terms of convictions lost by suppression rulings, 3 the
drug sale at the Price Drive residence. The anonymous letter-writer in Gates was wholly unknown to
the police and gave no inkling as to how he or she had come by his or her information. See Kamisar,
supra note 4, at 552-53. Third, the subjects of police surveillance in Leon, Stewart excepted, had
criminal records involving narcotics violations. Fourth, the corroboration established by the police in
Leon was more suggestive than in Gates (an on-going pattern of suspicious activity as opposed to a
single trip to Florida). Finally, the informant in Gates predicted that Sue Gates would drive down to
Florida and then immediately fly back to Chicago. In fact, she did not do so, but was last observed
before the warrant was sought with Lance Gates in the family car. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
291-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Kamisar, supra note 4, at 554.
60. United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. 104 S. Ct. at 3412.
62. Id. at 3412-13 (citation omitted).
63. See Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983
A.B.F. REs. J. 585, 598 (successful motions to suppress physical evidence oceured in 0.69% of 7,484
criminal cases sampled); Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About
the "Costs" Of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983
A.B.F. RES. J. 611, 617-22 (National Institute of Justice study indicates that California prosecutors
decline fewer than 1% of felony arrests because of search and seizure problems; other studies indicate
that exclusionary rule's combined effects at all stages of arrest processing "only results in the non-
prosecution and/or nonconviction of in the range of 0.6% to 2.35% of felony arrests in the jurisdictions
studied"); Report of the Comptroller General, Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal
Prosecutions (Rep. No. CDG-79-45) (1979) (suppression motions based on Fourth Amendment
granted in 1.3% of sample of 2,804 federal cases; convictions obtained in half of the cases in which
motions were granted). Most directly relevant is R. VAN DUIZE.ND, L. StrrroN & C. CARTER, THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 57 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NCSC STUDYI, indicating that for the seven cities studied, motions to suppress were
granted in only 5% of prosecutions involving search warrants.
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Court fell back on the notion that "the small percentages . . . mask a
large absolute number of felons who are released because the cases against
them were based in part on illegal searches or seizures." 6" Justice White
made no estimate as to what proportion of this "large absolute number"
was freed by unlawful searches conducted in objectively reasonable reli-
ance on defective search warrants, or what proportion of these good-faith
but unlawful warrant searches might have been conducted in accordance
with the Fourth Amendment absent an exclusionary rule.65 The Court's
real view about cost appears at the end of its apologetic footnote on the
subject: "Because we find that the rule can have no substantial deterrent
effect in the sorts of situations under consideration in this case . . . we
conclude that it cannot pay its way in those situations."6
The justification for the good-faith exception therefore turns on the ab-
sence of any deterrent benefits from excluding evidence in the search war-
rant context. On this issue, the Court began by offering three reasons for
rejecting the possibility that exclusion might improve the performance of
issuing magistrates:
First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Second,
there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are
inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment . . . . Third,
[we do not believe] that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a
warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge
or magistrate. 67
The Court is probably safe in discounting the idea that specific suppres-
sion orders penalize specific issuing magistrates in a way that encourages
compliance with the probable cause requirement. But the assertion that
"there exists no evidence" impugning the vigilance of magistrates deserves
little credence, accompanied as it is by a footnote to leading authorities
adopting a contrary view,6" and ignoring as it does the record of judicial
64. 104 S. Ct. at 3413 n.6.
65. On the first point, see id. at 3442 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe costs due to the exclusion
of evidence in the narrower category of cases where police have made objectively reasonable mistakes
must necessarily be even smaller."); LaFave, supra note 5, at 904. The second point, that convictions
lost by applying the exclusionary rule are not a cost attributable to the exclusionary rule but rather to
the Fourth Amendment itself, has been made often. See, e.g., Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3436-37 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); The Exclusionary Rule Bills: Hearings on S. 101, S. 751 and S. 1995 Before the
Subcornm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 365
(statement of Yale Kamisar) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclu-
sionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1025, 1037-38 (1974); Stewart, supra note 4, at 1392-93.
66. 104 S. Ct. at 3413 n.6 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 3418.
68. Id. at 3418 n.14 (choosing among conflicting authorities, Justice White summarily rejects
adverse findings).
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compliance with government requests for court-ordered electronic
surveillance. 69
Nor did the majority find that the risk of exclusion significantly de-
terred law enforcement officers. Initially, the majority noted that in war-
rant cases "there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter ...
'[O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman
can do in seeking to comply with the law.' "70 This discussion, however,
fails to consider the decision to seek a warrant in the first place. As the
Court itself later cautions, "[i]t is necessary to consider the objective rea-
sonableness, not only of the officers who eventually executed a warrant,
but also of the officers who originally obtained it or who provided infor-
mation material to the probable-cause determination."7 " Prior to the issu-
ance of warrants, the police are likely to gather more evidence of probable
cause if there is a greater risk of suppression.7 2
The Court, however, has a stock reply to the claim "that applying the
exclusionary rule in cases where the police failed to demonstrate probable
cause in the warrant application deters future inadequate presentations or
'magistrate shopping' and thus promotes the ends of the Fourth Amend-
ment."7 3 "We find such arguments speculative and conclude that suppres-
sion of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on
a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion
will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule."17 4
Kind words for the Court's opinion have not come easily.7 5 Without
establishing any constitutionally tolerated costs to exclusion in warrant
cases, the Court deems these costs to outweigh "speculative" deterrent
benefits evident in the case at bar. The Court also neglects the conse-
69. Warrant applications for electronic surveillance are only rarely denied. See Hearings Before
the National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance 7 (1976) (statement of Henry Petersen) ("Between 1969 and 1973 there were
3838 applications for intercept orders made, and 3836 were granted."). While such statistics do not
conclusively prove that judges are rubber stamps for the police, it is scarcely fair to describe the record
as "no evidence" for that proposition.
70. 104 S. Ct. at 3420 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 3421 n.24.
72. In Leon itself the police consulted three deputy district attorneys before presenting their appli-
cation. Id. at 3410.
73. Id. at 3419.
74. Id. (footnote omitted). The "unusual cases" in which suppression remains appropriate, the
Court explains, id. at 3421-22, are cases in which: (1) the police mislead the magistrate with know-
ingly false or reckless statements; (2) the magistrate abandons the judicial role under circumstances in
which no well-trained officer would rely on her authorization; (3) the application is "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable," id. (quot-
ing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)); and (4) the
warrant fails on its face to particularize the objects of the search. See also LaFave, supra note 5, at
911-26.
75. See supra notes 5-6. But see N.Y. Times, July 6, 1984, at 1, col. 6 (asked about decision,
President Reagan replied that he "loved it").
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quences that the Gates result may have on the justification for the good-
faith exception. Moreover, Justice White offers no remedy to replace the
exclusionary rule for warrant searches that are not supported by probable
cause and therefore contrary to the letter of the Constitution.
Nonetheless, without approving the Court's somewhat disingenuous
Leon opinion, this Article undertakes a defense of its result. A successful
defense of the Leon result must refute the claims that defendants have a
personal right to exclusion (the categorical objection) and that the good-
faith exception will increase the likelihood of unreasonable searches (the
analytical objection). The next two Sections of this Article undertake this
task.
II. CATEGORICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE BALANCING APPROACH
If an unconstitutional search confers on the victim a personal right to
suppression of its fruits, the balancing approach of Leon proceeds from an
erroneous interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 6 The personal rights
theory, however, must overcome the apparent distinction between the
search, which is illegal because it invades privacy without sufficient justi-
fication, and admission of the evidence, which does not itself invade the
privacy of the search victim.
77
Proponents of a personal right to exclusion have pursued two basic ap-
proaches connecting the admission of evidence with the illegal searches
that discovered it. One type of argument asserts that the admission of the
evidence is really part of the search itself. The search and the trial are
said to be part of a "unitary transaction," by virtue either of the police
purpose to use the evidence they hope to find,78 or of the judicial duty to
review unconstitutional executive actions.7 9 A second type of argument
claims that use of evidence obtained unconstitutionally creates a new and
independent constitutional wrong, by denying the defendant rights to
property,80 to due process,8" or against self-incrimination."
76. See 104 S. Ct. at 3432-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (refusing to give Mapp retroactive
effect) ("The misconduct of the police prior to Mapp has already occurred and will not be corrected
by releasing the prisoners involved."); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354.
78. See Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Re-
quirement, 59 MINN. L. Rv. 251, 289-307 (1974).
79. See id. at 335-72; Kamisar, supra note 7, at 590-97. A related argument links an exclusion-
ary right to the integrity of the judiciary. See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-24 (1960).
80. This view was prominent in the early cases. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
305-06 (1921); Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 HARV. L. REV. 673, 696-97
(1922). J.B. White has recently attempted to rehabilitate this approach. White, supra note 7.
81. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 78, at 335-66.
82. See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662 (Black, J., concurring); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 472-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Advocates of this latter argument have failed to articulate a discrete
constitutional violation in the admission of illegally obtained evidence. 8
As a result, most of these theories are rejected even by advocates of the
personal rights approach."' The unitary transaction theory has also
proved easier to announce than to substantiate. Even by its own logic, the
connection between the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule is
overbroad, for exclusion often neutralizes evidence the police might have
seized constitutionally."' So long as the gravamen of the Fourth Amend-
ment is privacy, any essential connection between the wrong of the search
and a subsequent official proceeding will remain somewhat mystical.8"
83. Neither the self-incrimination theory nor the property theory can explain why a subpoena for
physical evidence does not work the same wrong as an illegal search. Fundamentally, the Fourth
Amendment forbids the government from learning of evidence through gratuitously intrusive means,
and not from obtaining evidence once its location has been discovered.
The property theory has the further defects of failing to account for the right to exclude contraband,
for the refusal to return contraband after it has been excluded, or for the inappropriateness of a
damage remedy instead of exclusion. Pressed on the latter point, Professor White concedes that
Fourth Amendment rights are political, not based on property. See White, supra note 7, at 1278 n.21.
Any other conclusion would put up "constitutional rights for sale whenever the government unilater-
ally decides to purchase them." Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Inno-
cent, 81 Mien. L. REv. 1229, 1266 n.168 (1983). For a convincing critique of the self-incrimination
theory, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 414-15
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The due process theory is a tautology: liberty may be restricted only according to the law of the
land, but if the Fourth Amendment does not itself command exclusion then a criminal conviction
based on illegal evidence is nonetheless rendered per legem terrae.
84. See Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 MiNN. L. REv. 1083, 1088-90 n.16 (1959) (criticizing self-incrimination theory); Schrock
& Welsh, supra note 78, at 263-69 (rejecting exclusion based solely on judicial integrity); id. at 363
n.276 (rejecting property theory).
85. In many cases the police could have obtained the evidence legally although in fact they did
not. For example, in Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984), government agents illegally
entered private premises and discovered, but did not seize or otherwise disturb, evidence in plain view.
Meanwhile other agents, without knowledge of the illegal entry, sought and obtained a search war-
rant. The Supreme Court, in a "carefully limited" disposition of the issue, held that the evidence was
properly admitted.
In many other cases the police have information amounting to probable cause but do not include all
of it in the warrant application, or lack probable cause but could establish it with further investiga-
tion. Any expansion of the Segura result, however, beyond an independent-source rule-any creation
of an inevitable legal discovery exception-would mean that the government could in every case urge
admission of the evidence because the police hypothetically might have complied with Fourth Amend-
ment standards. Thus the Sixth Circuit, on facts similar to those of Segura, excluded the evidence
because "[a]ny other view would tend in actual practice to emasculate the search warrant require-
ment." United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1050 (1974). But see Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253 (Wyo. 1984):
The officers had a reasonable purpose in securing the premises to prevent destruction of evi-
dence. They did not have an opportunity to obtain a search warrant before the potential for
such destruction became manifest. They acted in objective good faith, and if there was any
transgression it was minor. If they had waited for a search warrant and if the evidence were
not destroyed, the result would have been the same.
Id. at 259 (emphasis added). God help Wyoming.
86. See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 & n.16
(1975) ("Why the rule is 'an essential part' of that right [to privacy] has. . . never been made clear,"
although commentators have "attempted to fill the gap.").
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More importantly, whether the claimed connection between search and
use rests on the notion of a unitary transaction or of a derivative exclu-
sionary right, the claims to a personal right to exclusion rest on a mis-
taken interpretation of the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. The
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not the defeat of certain criminal
laws, but the protection of the lawful enjoyment of privacy.87 What makes
a search constitutionally reasonable is the probability, neutrally deter-
mined whenever possible, that evidence exists at the place to be searched.
Absent that probability, the search is no less intrusive; instead, the search
is illegal because it is not likely to yield the desired fruit. Since suspicious
but noncriminal activity is of no substantive concern to the government,
the only point to restricting searches to cases of probable guilt is to avoid
intruding on privacy when no evidence is present. With respect to a par-
ticular case, the actual existence of the evidence satisfies the value judg-
ment struck by the Amendment."8 Enforcement of the probable cause and
warrant requirements in cases of actual guilt therefore has the object of
protecting the lawful enjoyment of privacy in other cases.
This does not mean that any successful search is legal, because there is
no way to protect lawful privacy without also protecting criminal privacy.
The search without probable cause, however, is objectionable not because
it discovered evidence, but because it represents an official practice likely
to intrude upon the lawful enjoyment of privacy. A due regard for the
deterrent function of a Fourth Amendment remedy adequately responds to
the illegality of such an official practice.
In contrast to this positive prospective effect of the exclusionary rule,
suppression does nothing to undo the evil done by an illegal search to
those values that justify restricting searches in the first place.89 The evil of
87. Thus, when a police technique can reveal only evidence of crime, it does not constitute a
search. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (canine sniff for narcotics). Conversely,
whenever a police technique might unilaterally intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy, its
use is a search within the meaning of the Amendment. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
350-53 (1967); Loewy, supra note 83, at 1248-56.
88. The probable cause standard attempts to measure the presence of evidence in the face of
uncertainty. After the search the uncertainty in the instant case is dispelled. Compare California v.
Minjares, 443 U.S. 916, 921 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of application for recall
and stay) (That probable cause can only be "measured by objective facts known to the police officer
prior to the search ... while taken for granted today, was not inevitable. The Court certainly could
have held that discovery of the articles sought is compelling evidence that the search was justified.")
with S. SCHLESSINGER, ExcLusIoNARY INJUSTICE 48 (1977) (criminal conduct amounts to waiver of
Fourth Amendment right). What this approach ignores is that the pattern of police intrusion is larger
than a single successful example of it. If the police engage in a warrantless, house-to-house search,
doubtless in many places they will discover evidence of crime. Is "discovery of the articles sought...
compelling evidence that the search was justified"? I cannot imagine, say, James Otis answering that
question in the affirmative. But it remains necessary to link the illegal search that yields evidence to
other illegal searches that do not to make this point compelling.
89. See Schrock & Welsh, supra note 78, at 316-17 n.158 ("Critics properly scorn... exclusion
as compensation for unreasonable search and seizure.") (emphasis in original). Return of criminal
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the search lies not in the discovery of criminal evidence, but in the con-
comitant exposure to the government, and thereby the world, of all those
telltales of personality revealed in any place we take for private. To view
the exclusionary rule as a personal right is to constitutionally enshrine the
pistol in the basement or the cocaine in the coffee can, and to ignore as
immaterial the music on the stereo, the books on the shelf, and the fading
letters in the bedroom bureau drawer.
If this assessment of the Amendment's purpose is correct, none of the
theories designed to establish a personal right to exclusion is tenable. Each
theory attempts to link the initial illegality of the search with the ultimate
admission of its fruits." But linking the search and the trial still fails to
establish a constitutional basis for the rule, because the Fourth Amend-
ment in the first instance does not condemn the search when evidence
exists unless lawful privacy would otherwise be compromised.91 Only the
independent connection between illegal searches that discover evidence and
illegal searches that do not can make the case for the exclusionary rule,
and that case by its very nature depends upon deterrence.
Unless the probable cause requirement has the purpose of preventing
searches even when evidence exists-to create "a right to commit crime
within the four walls of one's abode secure from police intrusion" ' 2 or a
"privilege against conviction by unlawfully obtained evidence"as3
-the ex-
clusionary rule cannot protect a constitutionally cognizable interest of the
search victim. Yet the evil of crime does not vary in any coherent way
with its susceptibility to discovery; the suggestion that a restriction on
searches has the purpose of insulating substantive conduct from criminal
liability is accordingly remote. 94 Put another way, there is no normative
evidence restores only those aspects of personal privacy that the amendment has no purpose to protect.
90. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
91. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 78, at 278-79 n.85, criticize the notion that the criminal waives
her Fourth Amendment rights because waiver could be applied to all constitutional rights. But unlike
the Fifth Amendment, which explicitly recognizes a right against incrimination, the Fourth Amend-
ment recognizes a right to privacy limited by the need to enforce the law. That limitation inhabits the
probable cause standard by necessary implication-an implication entirely absent from other constitu-
tional guarantees such as the privilege against self-incrimination (which, as the term suggests, extends
primarily to the guilty), the right to counsel (for even the guilty, as plea-bargaining illustrates, may
benefit from counsel), and the right to jury trial (for the jurors may acquit against the evidence).
In any event, I do not maintain that the guilty waive all rights against unreasonable searches, but
only that the guilty have no right based on the presence of criminal evidence; "the right of the people"
runs against the practice of searching without probable cause, or a warrant. The criminal's right thus
exists solely because we cannot distinguish her case from others in advance, not because privacy in a
single case is more valuable than law enforcement.
92. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v.
Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. Rav. 565, 580 (1955) (footnote omitted) (opposing this view).
93. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1,
35 (footnote omitted) (apparently endorsing this view).
94. Singularly vicious crimes, such as the mass murders perpetrated by John Wayne Gacy or
Leonard T. Lake, often occur in complete privacy; singularly innocuous crimes, such as possesion of
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distinction between two criminals exposed respectively by legal and illegal
searches except that the criminal exposed by the illegal search is the target
of an arbitrary government intrusion. It is thus the reckless undertaking
rather than the fortuitous success of the search that the Amendment con-
demns. The pattern of police misconduct rather than the discovered evi-
dence is therefore the proper object of the constitutional remedy.
More than a decade ago, in his celebrated Holmes Lectures, Professor
Amsterdam drew a distinction between two basic perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment.95 One view interprets the Amendment as creating
atomistic spheres of personal privacy; the other interprets restrictions on
search and seizure as primarily directed toward regulating governmental
conduct. At the time, Professor Amsterdam objected to the Supreme
Court's tendency to adopt an atomistic perspective on rights that suffer in
general when not defended expansively in particular cases. Somewhat
ironically, the modern critics of the Court's exclusionary rule jurispru-
dence have themselves assumed this atomistic perspective, insisting that
the exclusionary rule follows from the personal rights guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment. As the previous discussion makes clear, with respect
to the exclusionary rule, the regulatory perspective follows from the values
protected by the Constitution. I believe that at least to a degree, the cur-
rent assault on the Court's balancing approach has less to do with an
articulable basis for an individual right to exclusion than with the appre-
hension that the current Court wrongly weighs the balance.98
marijuana, often occur in public.
95. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 367-72 (1974).
96. Of course, it is no answer to an argument that its proponents have come to it late or for
private reasons. Nevertheless, the logical object of criticism from the personal rights perspective is not
Calandra, but Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), refusing to give Mapp retroactive effect.
Yet the fire directed against Linkletter had little to do with the Court's interpretation of the exclusion-
ary rule, but rather concerned the then-novel announcement of a judicial power to make new law and
apply it only prospectively. See Haddad, "Retroactivity Should be Rethought": A Call for the End of
the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRim. L., CRIMONOLOGY & POLICE Scr. 417, 424-41 (1969). Prior to
Calandra, Professor Kamisar confesses, many defenders of the exclusionary rule, himself included,
had accepted the deterrence line of reasoning. See Kamisar, supra note 7, at 617-21. This suggests
that the deterrence rationale was not so unstable or unprincipled as now supposed in light of the
Court's manipulation of the cost/benefit analysis. I would be surprised if Justice Traynor's exclusion-
ary rule decisions, e.g., People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955), although
clearly dominated by the deterrence rationale, were condemned, as are the current Supreme Court's
decisions, because "the language of deterrence involves the Court in a set of judgments that it is
incompetent to make, and avoids those more particular judgments that it is its duty to make. .... "
White, supra note 7, at 1283. After all, Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren joined the Court's
opinion in Linkletter. That even now, in light of Calandra and its myopic progeny, the Court's critics
are at pains not to disavow Linidetter's result strongly suggests that the real dispute is not about
absolute rights and cost/benefit analysis, but about the terms upon which the cost/benefit analysis
will turn. See McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REY. 659, 692-93 (1972).
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III. ANALYTICAL OBJECTIONS
If the exclusionary rule is not a personal right of the accused, its appli-
cation must depend on some more general objective of public law. At least
since Calandra, the Supreme Court consistently has ascribed a deterrent
purpose to the rule and balanced the benefits of deterrence against the
costs of freeing the guilty. This Part considers whether the Leon majority
correctly applied the Calandra balancing test.
Critics of the Court maintain that the Leon majority overstated the
costs and underestimated the benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to
warrant cases.97 They note that the available empirical data indicate that
very few convictions are lost to suppression orders in warrant cases,9 8 and
that withdrawal of the exclusionary sanction may contribute to the execu-
tion of defective warrants in a variety of ways.99 In this view, Leon elimi-
nates the incentive for the police to present the strongest possible applica-
tion,100 the incentive for the police bureaucracy to create screening
procedures for warrant applications,10 1 the incentive for magistrates to
take their role seriously,10 2 and the incentive for maintaining police train-
ing programs in search and seizure law.'0 3 Even granting the force of
these contentions, however, Leon poses only a minor risk of encouraging
speculative search warrants.
This assessment of deterrence is based upon the actual operation of the
search warrant process. In particular, two facts confirmed by the available
empirical data deserve emphasis. Warranted searches almost always un-
cover incriminating evidence, and this evidence, even before Gates, was
almost never excluded.
The evidence supporting the second conclusion-that warrant searches
rarely result in suppression-is overwhelming. Studies consistently have
concluded that the fraction of convictions lost due to suppression amounts
97. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3441-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3454-56 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); LaFave, supra note 5, at 903-11.
98. 104 S. Ct. at 3441-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaFave, supra note 5, at 904.
99. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 456-57 (pre-Leon critique of good-faith
exception).
100. See 104 S. Ct. at 3445 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("IT]he good faith exception will encourage
police to provide only the bare minimum of information in future warrant applications."); id. at 3454
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven when the police know their warrant application is probably insuffi-
dent, they retain an incentive to submit it to a magistrate, on the chance that he may take the bait.").
101. LaFave, supra note 5, at 910 ("Why should a police officer take the risk that some conscien-
tious prosecutor or police supervisor will say the application is insufficient when, if some magistrate
can be induced to issue a warrant, the affidavit is thereafter virtually immune from challenge?").
102. 104 S. Ct. at 3444 (Brennan, J., dissenting); LaFave, supra note 5, at 906-09.
103. 104 S. Ct. at 3444 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor LaFave made the point prior to Leon
that a failure to apply the exclusionary rule in the good-faith context communicates "an unmistakable
message to society at large and to law enforcement supervisors; namely, that there really is no need to
expend the money or time that is needed to adequately train the police." Senate Hearings, supra note
65, at 329 (statement of Wayne LaFave).
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to less than 1% of all arrests.104 Given the deference due search warrants
even before Gates,'05 there is reason to suspect that the losses in warrant
cases would be lower than in other Fourth Amendment cases. The most
recent and thorough study of the search warrant process, a survey of war-
rant practice in seven cities carried out under the auspices of the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC), found that motions to suppress were
granted in only 5% of the prosecutions involving warrants. 06
These figures strongly support Professor LaFave's description of the
Leon majority's cost analysis as "apparently embrac[ing] the kind of cock-
eyed characterization which previously had been found almost exclusively
in the least sophisticated anti-exclusionary rule diatribes. 1 0 7 Moreover,
successful suppression motions do not guarantee acquittals; in the NCSO
sample, for example, at least two thirds of the prosecutions involving suc-
cessful suppression motions nevertheless yielded convictions.10 Even this
number overstates the cost of exclusion because at least some of the "lost"
convictions could never have been obtained had the police obeyed the
Fourth Amendment,10 9 and because the Gates decision has made suppres-
sion less likely than before."10 Hard data thus confirm that lost convictions
in warrant cases constitute a mere trace element in the criminal justice
system. Thus, the Supreme Court certainly could have decided, like the
Mississippi court that reviewed a decade of its own decisions and found
but a single conviction reversed because of a defective search warrant,1 1'
that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it.""
l x2
Nevertheless, to analyze the decision the Court chose to render, it is
necessary to ask why search warrants are so rarely subject to successful
attack. To some extent the low rates of lost conviction may indicate judi-
cial reluctance to apply the exclusionary rule.113 But judicial hostility to
the exclusionary rule, although doubtless present in certain cases, is not
the only explanation for a low rate of lost convictions. The second fact
104. See supra note 63.
105. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) (magistrate's determination
"should be paid great deference by reviewing courts"); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106
(1965) ("[I]n a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without
one it would fall.").
106. NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 57.
107. LaFave, supra note 5, at 905.
108. NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 56.
109. See 104 S. Ct. at 3457 (Stevens, J., dissenting); LaFave, supra note 5, at 905-06.
110. See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 585-89.
111. Stringer v. State, No. 54,805, slip op. (Miss. Feb. 27, 1985) (available on Lexis and
Westlaw).
112. Id.
113. On trial-court hostility to the exclusionary rule, see M. WILKEY, ENFORCING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT BY ALTERNATIVES TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 18-20 (1982), reprinted in Senate
Hearings, supra note 65, at 437-39; Kaplan, supra note 65, at 1045; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 4, at 449.
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about search warrants-their surprising accuracy in predicting the loca-
tion of criminal evidence-provides an objective indication that the low
suppression rate is consistent with the thesis that most warrants are val-
idly issued.
In the NCSO study, the authors measured the frequency with which
warrant searches resulted in the seizure of evidence described in the war-
rant, based on the number of returns filed. In six of seven cities, 4 the
proportion of searches that discovered at least some of the evidence named
in the warrant ranged from 74% to 89%.115 That record, reflecting the
best available information, is strikingly impressive."' 6
Reviewing judges, therefore, do not need to endorse mere fishing expe-
ditions to ensure admissibility of evidence. While discovery of evidence of
itself does not prove the antecedent demonstration of probable cause in the
affidavit, the discovery of fruits anticipated in the warrant application in
the vast majority of the searches strongly suggests that the reason for the
low rate of lost convictions is not judicial manipulation but the prevalence
of sound warrant applications.
As critics of Leon suggest, the success of the warrant process may re-
flect the salutary influence of the exclusionary rule prior to its unwise
curtailment.11 7 I am convinced, however, that this explanation is at least
largely mistaken.
The exclusionary rule does not so much punish the police as remove
one incentive for illegal searches. Thus the exclusionary rule does no more
than render a particular search fruitless, just as if no evidence had been
found in the first place. But the very high success rate of warrant searches
suggests that warrants are not sought in cases of marginal suspicion."'
114. In one of the seven cities, returns were filed in only about half the cases, a lapse due in part
to the failure to file a return for unproductive searches and in part to defective record-keeping prac-
tices. NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 47-48.
115. These percentages were obtained by taking the percentage of searches in cases in which
returns were filed that led to seizure of some item named in the warrant, id. at 50, and multiplying
that percentage by the percentage of warrants for which returns were in fact filed, id. at 46. See also
Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Stan-dards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 723 (1972) (success rate for search warrants based on informant's informa-
tion was 64% in 1968 and 70% in 1969; success defined as seizure of evidence regardless of whether
warrant specified seized item).
116. This high success rate is especially surprising because "probable cause" may refer to a quan-
tum of suspicion that under certain circumstances is less than more-probable-than-not. See MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 210.1(7) & commentary at 449 (Proposed Official Draft1975). The tenor of the Gates opinion suggests as much. See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 588; Grano,
supra note 50, at 495-501; cf 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 50, § 3.2(e).
117. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 456 ("[A]n effective system for the issuance of
warrants. . . can, in no small measure, be attributed to the exclusionary rule.").
118. It may indeed be the case that the expected success of possible searches declines precipitously
after the point of virtual certainty. If most warrant searches are of the latter category-e.g., searches
of a suspect's abode after her arrest has yielded evidence of the crime, searches based on a police
undercover operation, and so on-but a few warrant searches are speculative, then the overall success
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The police, thus, appear to decline the search warrant process even when
a very substantial chance of obtaining admissible evidence exists. The lim-
iting factor appears to be something other than the risk of exclusion.
The more likely explanation for the success of warrants focuses on the
costs of the warrant process to police. If the police view obtaining a war-
rant as a costly proposition, a proposed search would have to promise very
likely returns to justify the expenditure of law-enforcement resources." 9 A
warrant application, such as Officer Rombach's, that involves a substan-
tial time commitment for drafting and screening, will not be undertaken
without a very high subjective expectation that evidence will be found. A
speculative search, inspired by "mere suspicion," certainly risks suppres-
sion of its fruits, but that threat is minor compared to the intrinsic costs of
the warrant process.
The responses of law-enforcement officers interviewed for the NCSC
study illustrate the primacy of the cost factor in the decision to obtain a
warrant:
Delay and inconvenience were widely cited as the principal basis
for officers' reluctance to seek a search warrant. Said one detective in
Mountain City:
[Ylou see, search warrants are double the time, sometimes
rate of warrant searches would be close to the success rate revealed in the NCSC data, but the ex-
pected success of additional warrant searches could be quite low. But there are good reasons for
doubting any such discontinuous distribution of probable search success. First, when empirical data
are collected for the warrant searches considered least likely to succeed in the aggregate-the confi-
dential informant cases-the rate of success is only marginally lower than for other types of warrant
searches. Rebell found that for this type of warrant search, the success rate, unadjusted for seizures of
items not specified in the warrant, was 64% and 70% in two different years. Rebell, supra note 115,
at 723. Compare the figures for "Harbor City," NCSC STuDY, supra note 63, at 42 table 2-11, and
id. at 50 table 2-19.
Second, my impression is that often when evidence is excluded for failure to obtain a warrant, little
doubt exists that the police could have established probable cause for the search. If warrantless
searches were categorically less likely to succeed than warrant searches, the warrant requirement
would largely overlap with the probable cause requirement. Together, these impressions suggest that
the expected success rate of searches varies across a continuum rather than declining dramatically
after the point of virtual certainty.
A further potential difficulty is that the police perception of the costs and returns to searching may
not comport with the Fourth Amendment. In ordinary cases, the cost of the warrant process may
demand a high expectation of success, but in a case involving, say, the shooting of a law-enforcement
officer, the police may perceive any chance of discovering evidence to be worth the effort. To suppose
that prosecutorial screening would not lose much of its rigor in such cases, absent the exclusionary
threat, would blink reality. Nonetheless, policy must speak to the ordinary and not the exotic case. In
general, the costs of the warrant process are not arbitrary, but geared to the encouragement of consti-
tutional behavior. In this form, these costs ordinarily have sufficed to ensure that warrants issue only
on a basis considerably stronger than mere suspicion.
119. This is the fundamental tenet of price theory: consumption will fall as price rises. The whole
analysis could accordingly be put in economic terms, complete with graphs, models, and technical
vocabulary. In the instant case I think the point is better conveyed by relating the less formal line of
inquiry that led me to the present conclusions.
926
Living with Leon
triple the time that you take on arrest warrants, and arrest
warrants are long enough. Arrest warrants, you figure a half a
day.
Another added:
Actually, there are a lot of warrants that are not sought be-
cause of the hassle. You just figure it's not worth the has-
sle. . . . I don't think you can forego a case because of the
hassle of a search warrant, but you can . . . work some other
method. If I can get consent [to search], I'm gonna do it.12 °
The authors conclude that "[tlhe effort and time required [were] cited by
many law enforcement officers as the most troublesome disincentives to
obtaining a search warrant. 1 21
Other things equal, the exclusionary rule might make a difference in
the government's decision to obtain a warrant, by reducing the expected
return to the search. Yet even on the assumption that the withdrawal of
the exclusionary rule from warrant cases will induce the police to conduct
warrant searches which otherwise would not take place at all, the cost of
obtaining a warrant will ensure that the additional searches are more than
mere fishing expeditions. If harassment is the goal, no warrant is re-
quired; 22 if evidence is the goal, the police will not waste the resources to
obtain a warrant on a mere chance that something might turn up.
This is not to say that the exclusionary rule does not influence search
and seizure activity; indeed, I believe the evidence unequivocally confirms
the exclusionary rule's impact on police behavior. 23 Absent the exclusion-
120. See NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 21.
121. Id. at 151. See also L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECFION OF CRIME
113-15 (1967).
122. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (The exclusionary rule "is powerless to deter
invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting
or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal."). Even when
the police hope to obtain admissible evidence, a warrant is rarely indispensable. Persons and vehicles
are always subject to the "arrest incident to a search," and even residences may yield admissible
evidence if consent, liberally understood, is given. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG,
supra note 121, at 122 ("It is also a fact that many arrests are made, not primarily to obtain custody
of the suspect, but rather as a method of providing a legitimate basis for making a search."). See
generally 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 50, at § 8.1. Under Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218(1973), the police need not warn the suspect of the right to refuse consent, and the focus of inquiry
turns to whether the "consent" was "voluntary," i.e., not the product of police coercion.
123. I am at a loss to explain the prevailing agnosticism on this issue, e.g., United States v. Janis,
428 U.S. 433, 449-54 (1976). Although crude, the best measure of the exclusionary rule's success is
the rate of successful suppression motions, because granted motions directly measure the legality of the
search. Two studies claim to discredit the deterrent hypothesis by depending largely on inferences
drawn from a continued high rate of successful suppression motions in Chicago, despite enforcement
of the exclusionary rule. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REv. 665, 681-89 (1970); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclu-
sionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 243 (1973). More recent and comprehensive data
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ary rule, the police have no incentive to obtain warrants except the spec-
tral possibility of civil damages. Not surprisingly, warrant use increased
dramatically after Mapp v. Ohio.124 Even when the police do not seek a
warrant, they attempt to conform their conduct to one of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement, typically search incident to arrest or consent.
This obedience to legal form would be pointless but for the exclusionary
rule. And forceful testimony from informed observers strongly suggests
that exclusion significantly diminishes illegal police conduct.
2
'
The prospect of suppression, then, encourages the use of warrants, but
once it becomes clear that admission of the evidence depends on securing a
warrant, the costs of the warrant process, independent of the exclusionary
rule, create a powerful disincentive to speculative searches. In light of this
analysis, Leon probably will not have much deleterious impact on police
willingness to seek dubious warrants. Absent a strong expectation of suc-
cess, the police will not undertake the cost.
1 26 Nor do I believe that the
indicate overwhelmingly, however, that the successful suppression motion is quite rare. See supra 
note
63. Unless defense attorneys neglect to file motions in a great many meritorious cases, these figures,
based on far broader samples of contemporary cases, indicate that the appropriate inference about
deterrence is the opposite of that initially suggested by the Oaks and Spiotto research. The possibility
of defense neglect appears unlikely in light of Nardulli's data indicating that the percentage of total
cases involving successful motions does not vary coherently with the percentage of cases in which
motions are filed. See Nardulli, supra note 63, at 596, 598 (Table 9).
124. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New
Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 708-11 (1974) (warrant use in
Cincinnati rose from 0-7 per year to 89-113 following Mapp; in Boston, the number of warrants rose
from 176-267 to 560-940); Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement, 44
Tax. L. REv. 939, 941-42 (1966) (prior to Mapp, search warrants "had been rarely used," but as of
December, 1965, 17,889 had been obtained). The magnitude of this increase and the cost factor make
it unlikely that the increase resulted from any independent development.
125. For example, Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 400-01 & nn.174 & 175, document
police responses to several Supreme Court decisions. Following the Court's decision in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random traffic stops unconstitutional), the District of Columbia Police
Department, which previously had relied on a contrary case from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals,
immediately issued a directive ordering compliance with the decision. Id. at 400. The Delaware State
Police took similar action following the trial court's decision in Prouse, which the Supreme Court
ultimately affirmed. Id.
Even two prosecutors with quite different views of the exclusionary rule controversy reach the same
conclusion. See Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 336-37 (statement of G. Robert Blakey) ("To the
degree that I have been involved in [criminal justice] for 20 years, I will tell you unequivocally that
the exclusionary rule, in fact, deters. . . . Anyone who suggests to you the contrary in my judgment
doesn't know what he is talking about."); Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense,
CRIM. JUST. ETucs, Summer/Fall 1982, at 28, 30 ("I have watched the rule deter, routinely,
throughout my years as a prosecutor.").
126. The wiretap evidence, which is entirely consistent with the general account of the warrant
process given in the text, is especially illuminating in this regard. Under Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982), law enforcement of-
ficers may engage in electronic surveillance only after obtaining a warrant as provided by the statute,
which includes several procedural hurdles absent from the ordinary warrant procedure. As the previ-
ous discussion would lead one to expect, the costly nature of the procedure, in particular the statuto-
rily mandated executive screening, operates as a strong disincentive to frivolous warrant requests.
Applications for electronic surveillance authorizations are virtually never denied, see supra note 69,
but this is probably not the result of rubber-stamping by the judiciary. As Professor Blakey observed,
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good-faith exception will weaken the vigilance of reviewing magistrates.
Although many commentators have minimized the scrutiny magistrates
actually apply to warrant applications,127 the NCSC data suggest that the
trial court judges who issue most warrants reject applications in a signifi-
cant number of cases.128 If issuing magistrates take the application process
seriously because they desire to avoid losing convictions on a subsequent
suppression motion, Leon may reduce the intensity of this stage of re-
view.129 For three reasons, I do not believe that such an erosion of magis-
terial scrutiny poses a serious threat to individual privacy.
First, the costs of the warrant process, independent of the final judicial
check, minimize the likelihood that a purely speculative search warrant
application will reach the judges at all. Second, even if judges have taken
a tough stance on warrant requests for the purpose of avoiding ultimate
suppression, outright preclusion of a proposed search would not have re-
sulted. Instead, such judges probably have told the police to strengthen the
application and then come back. Leon therefore may decrease the rigor
with which the application establishes probable cause, but probably will
not change the actual searches that take place. Third, any reduction in the
vigilance of magistrates sympathetic to the police must be considered along
with the possibility that other magistrates, knowing the likely un-
reviewability of their decisions, will scrutinize applications more carefully.
One unfortunate effect of the exclusionary rule on the warrant process
was to encourage the impression that the suppression hearing, which can-
not restore privacy, provides the proper forum for a thorough testing of
the warrant application.130 It has been noted that "the same judge may
2 Hearings Before the National Commission, supra note 69, at 1123, "except for a few judges, nonehave indeed denied orders. But our record indicates that the place where they are being denied is at
the prosecutorial level." Again as the textual account of the warrant process would suggest, electronic
surveillance warrants are accurately targeted and rarely result in suppression. For example, in 1982,83 of 84 motions to suppress in Federal District Court were denied; in the state courts, 43 of 45 weredenied. Of 130 warrants obtained by federal authorities, only 6 failed to produce any incriminating
evidence. Of the 388 state authorizations for which reports were filed, only 25 failed to produce
incriminating evidence. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Report on Applicationsfor Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communications for theperiod January 1, 1982 to December 31, 1982, at 23-85 (1983) (tables listing motions to suppress
and number of incriminating intercepts).
127. E.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 366 (statement of Yale Kamisar) ("You ask any
scholar about how the search warrant procedure works today and they will tell you it is a joke."); 2
W. LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 4.1, at 5-6.
128. NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 30-32 (average length of review two minutes and forty-
eight seconds; applications rejected in 8% of observed cases); id. at 64-67 (issuing judges harbor
different attitudes toward warrants but many take role seriously).
129. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 5, at 906-07; NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 129.
130. See NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 133-34 (One judge maintained that "police should begiven a certain amount of latitude at this initial point in the investigation because justice can be
ensured at a later stage, such as the preliminary hearing, when additional evidence is made available
for a full factual determination of probable cause.").
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consider the matter much more carefully when confronted with a motion
to suppress evidence in court than he did when asked to issue the search
warrant."'1 31 To this type of judge, Leon sends a clear signal: Do it right
the first time.
Which tendency will prevail-the willingness to obtain admissible evi-
dence even when probable cause must be fudged a bit, or the desire to
review the application seriously knowing that this review is the only real
check on the police-is difficult to tell until experience with the Leon rule
accumulates. The impact either way is likely to be less substantial than
supposed, especially to the extent that judges with warrant duty are
neither law-and-order adjuncts of the police, nor self-styled civil libertari-
ans, but conscientious people trying to apply the rules.
The most troubling aspect of the Leon result, from a deterrence per-
spective, is the possibility that the absence of the exclusionary sanction
may induce the law enforcement bureaucracy to dispense with some of the
screening procedures that have separated line officers from issuing
judges.1 2 In most large jurisdictions, a line officer who wants to obtain a
warrant must present the project either to a superior within the police
organization or to a government attorney."3 This review can lead to the
rejection of unsupportable applications and to the presentation of other
applications in the strongest possible terms."3 If this process is aban-
doned, some of the intrinsic reliability of search warrants will be lost.
It is also possible that by minimizing the pre-application investigation
police must undertake to support a warrant application, the good-faith
exception will decrease the costs, and thereby the reliability, of warrants.
Where previously the police could never be sure their investigation had
gone far enough, under Leon they know that the minimum showing re-
quired to convince an issuing magistrate will satisfy the reviewing court
on a motion to suppress.13 5 This will have the effect of reducing the time
required to establish probable cause, so that searches previously not worth
the cost of a warrant will become attractive.
131. L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 121, at 120. The authors ob-
serve that on rare occasions the judge who issued the warrant finds it defective at a subsequent sup-
pression hearing.
132. See supra notes 101 & 117.
133. NCSO STUDY, supra note 63, at 23-25 (preapplication screening either by police supervi-
sors, prosecutors, or both occurs in all cities studied); L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG,
supra note 121, at 114 ("The prevailing practice in large metropolitan areas is for all applications for
search warrants first to be reviewed by a member of the prosecutor's staff. .. ").
134. NCSO STUDY, supra note 63, at 25 ("From our interviews, however, it appears that al-
though few applications are screened out completely, in a significant number of cases (the estimates
varied from 10 percent. . . to between 33 and 50 percent. . .) the screening prosecutor will ask the
police officer to add information to the affidavit.").
135. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3444-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3454 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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A recent Louisiana decision, State v. Wood,1" 6 illustrates how far Leon
may go in this direction. An affidavit stated that a police officer believed
that "various narcotics, marijuana and other drug paraphernalia, and also
a [presumably stolen] 5200 Poulan chain saw with a bow bar" were in
the defendant's possession because: "I received information from two (2)
confidential informants that the above listed items have been seen at the
above location. These two (2) informants have found [sic] to be very relia-
ble in past investigations."1 37 The trial court had denied a motion to sup-
press, on the fantastic basis that the application established probable
cause. The appellate court rejected this reasoning, but upheld the convic-
tions on the authority of Leon.
The Louisiana court acknowledged that, under Leon, the exclusionary
rule remains available when the warrant application so plainly fails to
establish probable cause that reliance upon it is "entirely unreasona-
ble."' 138 The Leon majority cited the "bare bones" affidavit as an example
of such a situation." 9 The Wood court concluded, however, that "the affi-
davit in the present case is almost in the 'bare bones' category, but not
quite. 1 40
If this is a correct reading of Leon, then indeed there is much to fear. In
Wood, a deputy sheriff, evidently entirely on his own authority, obtained
the warrant. The only investigative effort involved appears to be typing a
form-and perhaps inventing the informants. Not surprisingly, when the
cost of obtaining a warrant is so low, the warrant application turned out
to be wildly inaccurate.1 41 A search based on no more than such frail
suspicion is very likely to cut to the core of the Fourth Amendment by
thrusting the police into the private affairs of entirely innocent parties.
If Leon is not to endanger legitimate privacy interests by reducing the
cost of the warrant process, it must be interpreted not to apply to cases
such as Wood. This is entirely possible; there could scarcely be more dif-
ference between the warrant issued for the search of Wood's trailer and
Officer Rombach's 28-page affidavit, based on a known informant and a
month of surveillance, and reviewed by three government attorneys. In-
136. 457 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
137. Id. at 208.
138. Id. at 209.
139. 104 S. Ct. at 3422. The Court evidently refers to Justice Whites concurring opinion in
Gates, 462 U.S. at 263-64, a passage in which Justice White (the author of the Leon opinion) indi-
cated that even under a good-faith regime, he "would apply the exclusionary rule when it is plainly
evident that a magistrate or judge had no business issuing a warrant," citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378U.S. 108 (1964), and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). The only thing about theWood affidavit that might make it more probative than the Nathanson and Aguilar warrants is the
ritual invocation of not one "reliable" informant, but two.
140. 457 So. 2d at 210.
141. All the officers found was "a small quantity of marijuana." Id. at 207.
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deed, another state court recently held police reliance on a warrant "en-
tirely unreasonable" on facts far stronger than those in Wood.
142 The
Leon Court described the basic inquiry as "whether a reasonably well-
trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the
magistrate's authorization," an inquiry in which "all of the circum-
stances" may be considered.143 Taking Leon for the moment at face value,
I submit that well-trained officers would not seek a warrant without (1)
significant independent investigation and (2) internal screening by a police
superior or a government lawyer. Accordingly, in the absence of indepen-
dent investigation and preapplication screening, the good-faith exception
should not apply.
The independent investigation element would help combat the ugliest
risk that Leon encourages, the police-manufactured anonymous 
tip.144
The responsible thing for an officer to do on receiving a tip, anonymous
or otherwise, is not to dash to the nearest magistrate for a warrant but to
do what Officer Rombach did-check the tip against other information,
particularly the justice system's criminal records. A warrant application
supported by independent police work reduces the risk of intruding on
innocent privacy in two ways. First, a particularly extravagant tip may be
rejected if the independent investigation fails to corroborate the informant.
Second, by attaching some cost even to the use of "Old Reliable,"
1 45 an
independent investigation requirement would discourage warrant applica-
tions based on mere suspicion. The Leon Court did not discuss the impor-
tance of independent investigation in general; but in connecting the good
faith inquiry to "all of the circumstances," and in deciding that the Bur-
bank police were entitled to rely on the warrants at issue in part because
the "affidavit related the results of an extensive investigation,"
46 the
Court clearly has left room for consideration of independent investigation
as a factor, and perhaps as a requirement, in a showing of good faith.
Executive branch screening of warrant applications serves the same
142. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985). In Thompson, an anonymous informant
claimed that the defendants were selling marijuana from their home; the police were able to corrobo-
rate the informant's representations on all noncriminal details. The same informant had previously
provided completely accurate information that had led to a specified criminal conviction. Although the
Thompson opinion does not say, the detail with which the application was made suggests that some-
one with search warrant experience had a hand in drafting or reviewing it. Under the test I have
proposed, given this independent investigation and executive screening (I am assuming the latter), the
warrant process would by itself establish probable cause unless, to borrow Justice White's phrase, the
magistrate had no business issuing the warrant. Certainly the warrant issued in Thompson does not
fall within that category.
143. 104 S. Ct. at 3421 n.23.
144. For examples, see United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980); NCSC STUDY,
supra note 63, at 78.
145. Justice Douglas coined the phrase, dissenting in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 316
(1967).
146. 104 S. Ct. at 3423.
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functions. Unsound applications may be rejected or deferred until a
stronger showing can be made; and the cost of the screening process will
ensure that it is undertaken only in cases of substantial suspicion. Again
the Court left open the precise importance that the presence or absence of
screening should have on the good-faith inquiry. The "all of the circum-
stances" language suggests some consideration, and the favorable refer-
ences to Officer Rombach's consultations with the government lawyers re-
inforce this possibility.147
Indeed, it is difficult to identify other kinds of police conduct that con-
tribute to objective reasonableness, and anything other than conduct is
subjective. The district court finding in Leon itself illustrates the point:
"[T]here is not any question about good faith. [Officer Rombach] went to
a Superior Court judge and got a warrant; obviously laid a meticulous
trail. Had surveilled for a long period of time, and ... consulted with
three Deputy District Attorneys before proceeding. ' 148 Thus, the indicia
of objective reasonableness contained in the record before the Court were(1) the independent police investigation; (2) the prosecutorial screening;
and (3) the divided opinion of the court below on the substantive probable
cause issue. 149 A powerful argument therefore can be made that the Leon
exception does not apply absent independent investigation and executive
review of the application.
From the standpoint of deterrence, then, the Leon result is defensible,
so long as the costs of obtaining warrants restrict applications to cases of
substantial suspicion, confirmed by independent investigation and execu-
tive review. What we know about search warrants strongly suggests that
these costs, and not the exclusionary rule, explain the surprising success of
the warrant process.
IV. TOWARD A PROCEDURAL THEORY OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Despite the previous defense of the Leon result, this Article condemns
the Court's opinion based on an argument that I shall refer to as thejurisprudential objection. The gist of this objection is that by withdrawing
147. Id. at 3410. The Court cited with approval Professor Israel's observation that "the require-
ment that the officer act in 'good faith' is inconsistent with closing one's mind to the possibility of
illegality." Id. at 3420 n.20 (quoting Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy
of the Warren Court, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1319, 1413 (1977)). That observation related to police
training programs, but seems equally apposite to the question of screening; a well-trained officer
knows that she should process a warrant application through a superior or a prosecutor. The refusal
to consult a government attorney or a superior officer, and most particularly a decision to abandon
such screening procedures put in place before Leon, would seem to present a paradigm case of "clos-
ing one's mind to the possibility of illegality."
148. Leon, Petition for Certiorari at 14a.
149. See 104 S. Ct. at 3423. The latter factor is relevant only as a measure of how close to
probable cause the application came.
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the exclusionary sanction from an entire category of Fourth Amendment
violations for which no other sanction is available, even in theory, the
Leon majority has rendered "the constitutional language that all warrants
be issued only on a showing of probable cause. . . a nullity."'1 " In effect,
the Court maintains that searches pursuant to defective warrants violate
the Fourth Amendment, but that nothing happens when such violations
take place. This treats the amendment as a mere advisory norm rather
than, as the supremacy clause commands, as the "supreme Law of the
Land." '151 For all practical purposes, a search unsupported by probable
cause but pursuant to a facially valid warrant is now legal.
The vice in the Court's opinion, however, can be cured by accepting
this conclusion. If Leon were reformulated as a procedural analogue to
Gates, as the lower courts already have begun to treat it, then whatever
benefits the Court hopes the Leon rule will achieve could be obtained
without indulging in judicial hypocrisy. Perhaps it is too late for clearing
the air in this way, but I prefer, however naively, an outcome following
from reasons rather than preceding rationalizations, explained with can-
dor rather than with code words.
A. The Jurisprudential Objection
The majority opinion derived the good-faith exception from the line of
cases following Calandra, but an important distinction separates Leon
from the rest of the Court's exclusionary rule decisions. Calandra and its
progeny restricted the procedural settings in which the exclusionary rule
is available. For any given illegal search, the exclusionary rule remained
fully applicable during the government's case-in-chief at trial. By contrast,
Leon applied the Calandra calculus to a species of police conduct, not a
class of legal proceedings. After Leon, a search in good-faith reliance on
an insufficiently supported warrant cannot result in any application of the
exclusionary rule in any proceeding. Moreover, the class of cases from
which Leon withdraws the exclusionary sanction is the same class of cases
in which government agents as a matter of law are immune to damage
actions. Thus the Court has eliminated, not curtailed, the remedy.
52
Leon is therefore vulnerable to the objection that the majority opinion
fails to treat the Constitution as law. The Fourth Amendment states that
150. People v. David, 119 Mich. App. 289, 298, 326 N.W.2d 485, 488 (1982) (refusing to recog-
nize good-faith exception).
151. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
152. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3456 n.35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Malley v. Briggs, 54 U.S.L.W.
4243 (No. 84-1586 Mar. 5, 1986), the Court explicitly held that "the same standard of objective
reasonableness that we applied in. . . Leon . . . defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer
whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest." Id. at 4245 (footnote
omitted).
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"no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause." The Leon majority
announced that this provision could be violated but that nothing would
happen. Indeed the Court goes further, and says that nothing should hap-
pen, for "where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, . . . the
officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act under the
circumstances." 153 The implication is that the police have a duty to exe-
cute the illegal warrant. But the boilerplate language on most search war-
rants, taking the form of a court order to execute the search, scarcely insu-
lates the police from a Fourth Amendment violation. The command issues
only when the police ask for it, and in some cases the command issues but
no search takes place." Such executive discretion suggests that it is ab-
surd to describe a warrant as "a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct
a search or make an arrest, [which] the officer has a sworn duty to carry
out . . .,.
By purporting to recognize constitutional violations to which no sanc-
tion attaches, the Leon majority refused to treat the Fourth Amendment
as law. For law, as distinct from morality, is a system of political norms.
When political consequences do not attach to violations, normative pre-
scriptions do not qualify as laws. While a sanction itself may be insuffi-
cient to make a norm legal, there is almost no dispute that without the
possibility of sanctions a norm cannot be legal.1 51
153. 104 S. Ct. at 3420 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1970) (White, J., dis-
senting)) (emphasis added).
154. Warrant requests are rarely denied, see NCSC STUDY, supra note 63, at 32. Moreover, on
occasion a warrant will issue but not be executed. Id. at 47. Accordingly, it is entirely inappropriate
to speak of the warrant as a judicial rather than an executive creature.
155. 104 S. Ct. at 3420 n.21 (quoting ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME
FINAL REPORT 55 (1981)).
156. In this regard it is important to note that the critique of classical positivism raised by H.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27 (1961), does not deny the central role of political coercion to the
legality of norms. Hart argues that the Austinian model of law, conceived of as orders backed by
threats, fails to account for power-conferring rules such as those governing the validity of wills and
contracts. But Hart does not suggest, and it would plainly be unnatural to suggest, that such a rule
would be legal in character even though compliance was a matter of political indifference. The statute
requiring two witnesses for a valid will would not be properly termed a law if the heirs named in an
unwitnessed will took nevertheless. The rule would, in that instance, neither confer nor deny any
power whatever, and would have meaning, if at all, only as a moral exhortation to testators. Similarly
we would describe rules governing the operation of courts as laws only to the extent that compliance
with them affected the validity of judgments rendered, and welfare eligibility rules as laws only to the
extent that the state admits their binding force. Thus a norm upon whose observance the availability
of state power does not depend cannot be treated as legal.
The only legal theorists I know of who deny the necessity for political consequences to the legality
of municipal norms are David Lyons and Tony Honore, who argue that if toothless rules were ob-
served by a Utopian community, there would be "no good reason to deny that these people have a
legal system, though it is devoid of legal sanctions." D. LYONS, ETmICS AND THE RuLE OF LAW 47(1984); see Honore, Groups, Laws, and Obedience, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 20 (2d
Ser. A. Simpson ed. 1973). But this, like the proverbial marooned economist who assumes a can
opener, begs the question. If there are no violations, the Utopians surely have a moral system, but
what is the point of calling it legal? And if there are violations that go unsanctioned, the "good
reason" for saying no legal system exists is to distinguish the Utopian social system from social sys-
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For Holmes the point was fundamental. "If you want to know the law
and nothing else," he wrote, "you must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."1 '
Not surprisingly, Holmes defended an unyielding application of the exclu-
sionary rule, since admissibility "reduces the Fourth Amendment to a
form of words."15 8
The function served by a meaningful sanction is not solely "systemic
deterrence," although the sanction does contribute to that goal.159 To a
significant degree, the severity of the sanction expresses the importance of
the violated norm. 60 Even if the sanction does not deter, the refusal to
apply it or anything else expresses the judgment that the underlying norm
is of little importance. 6 Leon teaches that Fourth Amendment violations
do not matter. Such an evaluation betrays the fundamental principle of
constitutionalism, which is after all that the Constitution states the law.
This betrayal promises a further illegitimate effect. By treating the con-
stitutional norm as authoritative and revered, but the existence as well as
the scope of the sanction as contingent upon the judiciary's subconstitu-
tional discretion,' 62 the Leon approach greatly facilitates the substitution
of judicial for constitutional value choices. To some degree, the Constitu-
tion's meaning, like that of all laws, turns upon interpretation. But the
very existence of a Constitution asserts that its provisions are not wholly
indeterminate. 6 ' Those who accept that assertion should recognize the
danger to constitutional integrity presented by the Court's approach, a
danger that goes beyond the risks of irresponsible interpretation. For the
tems in which political coercion plays an important role.
157. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rzv. 457, 459 (1897).
158. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
159. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976) ("[Olver the long term, this demonstra-
tion that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights is thought to
encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who implement them, to
incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.") (footnote omitted).
160. See P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 87 (1984) ("The seriousness of the obligation is directly
proportional to the seriousness, as indicated by the severity of the attached sanctions, with which those
who demand others' compliance will view disobedience.").
161. Cf J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 157 (rev. ed. 1983) ("Even if we were absolutely
certain that a convicted murderer would never murder again, we would still feel obliged to impose a
relatively severe sentence in order to vindicate the principle that life is dear and may not be unlaw-
fully taken without paying a price.").
162. This is where the Leon Court parts company with Professor Monaghan's essay on constitu-
tional common law, which scrupulously avoids suggesting that the judiciary or the legislature has
discretion to withdraw all remedies from a category of constitutional violations. See Monaghan, supra
note 86, at 44.
163. "To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?" Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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Leon approach can justify the judicial nullification of a constitutional pro-
vision without straining interpretation. Indeed, as the Court acknowl-
edges, rather than bending the law, judges can gratify their antipathy to
the rule they have sworn to uphold by declaring the law violated but
unenforceable. 164
The same method can dispense with any constitutional guarantee. Yes,
the Court might acknowledge, Roe v. Wade6 5 held that the Constitution
forbids statutory interference with the decision to abort a fetus. But, "[a]s
with any remedial device," ' the availability of injunctive relief or Su-
preme Court review depends on a balancing of costs and benefits. While
the benefit of injunctive relief in securing the right to abortion is signifi-
cant, the cost in political turmoil and hostility to the judiciary has been
even greater. So, without in any way casting doubt on its decision in Roe,
the Court could elect, in its discretion, to withhold the injunctive remedy
against state statutes outlawing this constitutionally protected practice. 1 7
In exchange for this doctrinal danger, the Court gains nothing; declara-
tions of illegality not accompanied by any sanction serve no identifiable
purpose. The usual argument against the Holmes "bad man" position is
that the law also governs the "puzzled man" who is willing to do what is
required if only told what that might be."' Thus, Justice White noted in
Leon that resolution of the substantive Fourth Amendment question, prior
to good-faith analysis, may sometimes be "necessary to guide future action
by law enforcement officers and magistrates."169
But regardless of whether advisory norms directed to the voluntarily
obedient might count as laws in a general sense, constitutional limits on
164. 104 S. Ct. at 3422 n.26. In some instances, the courts may articulate a legal right that will
not become politically effective until some future time. See, e.g., NoteJudicial Right Declaration and
Entrenched Discrimination, 94 YALE L.J. 1741 (1985). This approach differs fundamentally from
the Leon Court's reasoning, in that Leon holds not that a new right is recognized and will eventually
be enforced, but that an old right remains recognized but will never be enforced. The former bifurca-
tion of right and remedy, unlike the latter, does not deny the ultimate availability of state power to
vindicate the right declared. Indeed, in cases of the former variety, the Court has maintained that
when the other branches of govenment "fail in their affirmative obligations" to effectuate judiciallydeclared constitutional rights, "judicial authority may be invoked" for that purpose. Swann v. Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1970). Were it otherwise, judicial recognition of rights would be indis-
tinguishable from the moral exhortations of all those who seek to influence the political branches of
the government.
165. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
166. The language is taken from Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, and is quoted in Leon, 104 S. Ct. at
3413.
167. There is no distinguishing the exclusionary rule as judicially created and the injunctive rem-
edy as constitutionally given. The Court admits as much when it speaks of "any remedial device." Inpoint of fact, all remedies for constitutional violations are judicially implied, see Kamisar, supra note
7, at 581-89, and the injunction device has received some of the same criticisms as the exclusionary
rule. See G. McDowELL, Equrry AND THE CONSTIuTION 14 (1982).
168. See H. HART, supra note 156, at 39.
169. 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
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state power can count as law only to the extent that they are enforced.
The Framers meant not just to establish a government, but to limit its
power over individuals. They viewed official power with an almost para-
noid suspicion; and they believed that suspicion justified by power's inher-
ent nature.'7 0 Theirs was indeed the "bad man's" view, for they saw in
official power the likely cultivation of bad men. They sought to oppose the
corrupting dynamics of power not with words but with laws enforceable
in courts of justice. 171 Hamilton expressed this view in the 78th Federalist
Paper: "Limitations, [on legislative authority] can be preserved in practice
no other way than through the medium of courts of justice. . . . Without
this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing.'1 7
2
Thus it is easy to see why Justice Stewart has written, with respect to
the good-faith exception, that "the framers did not intend the Bill of
Rights to be no more than unenforceable guiding principles-no more
than a code of ethics under an honor system. The proscriptions and guar-
antees in the amendments were intended to create legal rights and du-
ties."" Indeed, prior to Leon, even critics of the exclusionary rule had
stoutly asserted the necessity for some legal consequence attending illegal
searches. Chief Justice Burger, for example, in an influential critique of
the exclusionary rule, refused to "question the need for some remedy to
give meaning and teeth to the constitutional guarantees against unlawful
conduct by government officials. Without some effective sanction, these
protections would constitute little more than rhetoric.'1
7 4
170. For the classic exposition, see B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967).
171. As Madison said of the Bill of Rights in its entirety:
If [these rights] are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impen-
etrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will
naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Con-
stitution by the declaration of rights.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789). Ironically, and instructively, the citation of this passage passed from
the majority opinion in Mapp, 367 U.S. at 647, to a dissenting opinion in Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3431
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 524 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also Wilson, En-
forcing the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 28 CAT. LAW. 173, 175-83 (1983)
(Constitution was intended to be law, which implies remedy, although legislature might alter damage
action remedy implied by Fourth Amendment).
173. Stewart, supra note 4, at 1383-84 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
174. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 415 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Even the Court that decided Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was unanimous in holding that the Fourth Amendment binds the states
through the Fourteenth, and that the Constitution requires some remedy-the exclusionary rule or
another "equally effective." Id. at 31. Similarly Professors Kaplan, see Kaplan, supra note 65, at
1030, and Monaghan, see Monaghan, supra note 86, at 3-10, in various proposals to modify the
remedial mix, have not questioned the need for "something that works." Even Dallin Oaks concluded
his influential critique of the rule by urging its retention until meaningful substitutes are in place: "If
constitutional rights are to be anything more than pious pronouncements, then some measurable con-
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Even aside from the need for a Constitution of laws, Justice White's
vision of reviewing courts informing police and issuing magistrates of their
errors is far-fetched. The first and overriding problem with this vision is
that the Supreme Court itself does not seem to view bad warrants as un-
desirable. The rhetoric of the Leon opinion describes such illegal searches
as morally valuable. The loss of the evidence would be a "cost;" the ac-
tions of the police were "objectively reasonable." Language such as this
cannot inform police or judges of their errors, for it implicitly denies that
error has occurred.
Even assuming good-faith decisions incorporate some unambiguous de-
nunciation of illegal warrants, such condemnation probably will have no
effect on future law-enforcement activity. Certainly the documented atti-
tude of the police equates admissibility with legality.1" 5 As for judges,
even assuming they parse appellate opinions for occasional dicta about the
legality of a warrant they might remember issuing, there is no reliable
way for them to translate holdings about probable cause into prospective
standards. 7 8 The threat of exclusion may encourage police and judges to
take extra care in general in making such assessments-to "err on the side
of constitutional behavior."'"" But merely pointing out that a warrant was
issued illegally is no substitute for suppression, because an identical case
will never arise. So it is very difficult to see the point of the procedural
and forensic contortions that the Leon majority performed to preserve the
rhetoric of remedies. Whatever the propriety of Calandra's approach in
determining the applicability of the exclusionary rule in collateral pro-
ceedings, remedial analysis is plainly inappropriate when, as in Leon, the
issue is the elimination of all remedies in all proceedings.178
sequence must be attached to their violation. It would be intolerable if the guarantee against unrea-
sonable search and seizure could be violated without practical consequences." Oaks, supra note 123,
at 756.
175. See Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L.
REv. 24, 38-39 (1980) (extensive interviews with and observations of police indicate that in the ab-
sence of exclusionary rule "police would doubt the applicability of fourth amendment standards");
Kamisar, Is the Exclusionay Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 69-73 (1978) (prior to Mapp, police equated admissibility with
legality).
176. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. Indeed, the Court opined, "[tihere are so many variables in the
probable-cause equation that one determination will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another." Id.
at 238 n.11.
177. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982) (footnote omitted).
178. It might be objected that in many cases prior to Leon, no remedy was available for similar
violations: An innocent victim of an illegal search executed in good-faith reliance on a search warrant
could not invoke either a damage remedy or the exclusionary rule. But this argument repeats the
fallacy of the personal rights approach, for the relevant question is not whether the search victim has
a remedy but whether government lawlessness will encounter a sanction. Exclusion is a sanction
against the practice of searching without probable cause, and as such is enough to express the serious-
ness of the underlying norm. That the sanction is contingent on a fact other than the violation is not
essential, just as the nullification of an invalid contract depends on a breach of the contract. The point
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B. The Probable Cause Approach
Leon is better understood as a probable cause decision rather than as a
remedial, exclusionary rule decision. The warrant process itself provides
indicia of reliability sufficient to meet traditional standards of probable
cause, at least when that process includes independent investigation and
screening procedures. Predicating the admissibility of evidence in cases
like Leon on the legality of the search would avoid the danger of trivial-
izing the Constitution by recognizing rights without remedies.
1. Leon is a Probable Cause Decision in All But Name
Whatever its drawbacks, the probable cause approach accurately de-
scribes the Leon result. No adverse consequences attend an "invalid" war-
rant of the Leon variety. Nor does this result depend on the actual good
faith of the police. The Court went out of its way to "emphasize that the
standard of reasonableness we adopt is an objective one." ''9 Thus the
availability of the good-faith exception depends on the substantive content
of the warrant application-on how far short of the traditional probable
cause showing it falls. In effect, all the Court's decision accomplishes is to
reduce the degree of suspicion which a warrant application must establish
to insulate a search from the exclusionary rule.
Lower court interpretations of Leon confirm this analysis. Rather than
deciding whether a particular search warrant issued illegally, the courts
tend to decide whether the affidavit "was not so lacking in indicia of prob-
able cause that the officer executing the warrant could not with reasona-
ble objectivity rely in good faith on the magistrate's probable-cause deter-
mination."180 In practice, the issue of the existence of probable cause and
is that political consequences-the exercise or denial of official power at a litigant's behest-may turn
on the failure to abide the norm, and that these potential consequences signal the seriousness of the
rule.
179. 104 S. Ct. at 3420 n.20.
180. State v. Wildes, 468 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). For other examples, see
United States v. Gant, 759 F.2d 484, 486 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Because we find that the officers acted in
objective good faith, we need not resolve the probable cause issue."); United States v. One 1973 Chev-
rolet Pickup, No. 84-1085, (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1985) (available April 2, 1986 on LEXIS, Genfed
library, U.S. App. file) ("The District Court held that the affidavit for the warrant established proba-
ble cause. We need not review whether this is in fact the case. . . . The affidavit and warrant are not
so facially deficient that the warrant could not reasonably be presumed to be valid . . . ."); United
States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 835 (2d Cir. 1985) ("While we acknowledge that a creditable probable
cause question is raised, we do not reach it because we believe that, under the circumstances, we are
compelled by [Leon] to reverse the suppression order.") (citation omitted); Walker v. State, 462 So. 2d
794, 795 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) ("[E]ven if this defect invalidates the warrant, the stolen property
obtained when the search warrant was executed was still properly admitted into evidence."); People v.
Helmquist, 161 Cal..App. 3d 609, 612, 207 Cal. Rptr. 718, 719 (1984) ("After Leon, the correctness
of Helmquist's assertion of insufficient probable cause may be irrelevant.").
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the issue of good faith merge into a single inquiry about the sufficiency of
the warrant application.
At this reduced level of suspicion, it is "objectively reasonable" for the
police to rely on a warrant, and loss of the evidence would be a "cost."
Without maintaining, as Justice Stevens did in dissent,"'1 that an absolute
contradiction inhabits the Court's description of objectively reasonable un-
reasonable searches, one might question whether there is any difference
between saying that such searches are objectively reasonable and saying
that they are just plain reasonable. The Fourth Amendment's clear impli-
cation that a search without probable cause is unreasonable bars this in-
quiry; but if the issuing judge's probable cause decision is dispositive
within bounds of plain error, this obstacle would disappear. Thus the pro-
posed approach effects everything the Court expects the good-faith excep-
tion to achieve, with the added advantage of dispensing with the fiction
that Leon-type searches are illegal.
2. The Warrant Process Satisfies Traditional Standards of Probable
Cause
The traditional standard for probable cause provides that a search may
be undertaken when "the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief" that evidence will be discovered.182 And a "magistrate's 'deter-
mination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
courts.' " 8 It is not that large a move to identify the magistrate as the
formula's "man of reasonable caution." Such a move would not seriously
threaten individual privacy, and would be more faithful to the Fourth
Amendment than the Leon rationale.
A warrant application of the sort at issue in Leon presents at least two
features strongly suggestive of probable cause whenever it is attacked on a
motion to suppress. First, the cost of- the warrant process ensures that the
police object is admissible evidence, which they have a strong subjective
expectation of discovering. Second, a warrant search is authorized not only
by executive branch screening procedures, but also by an independent ju-
dicial officer. So long as preapplication screening procedures do not deteri-
181. 104 S. Ct. at 3446-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Aln official search and seizure cannot be
both 'unreasonable' and 'reasonable' at the same time."). The contradiction may be more apparent
than real, inasmuch as "reasonable" may be a term of constitutional art. No one supposed a contra-
diction to inhere in the good-faith defense to tort actions for unreasonable searches and seizures,
which presents the same doctrinal tension.
182. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)) (brackets in original).
183. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
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orate in response to Leon, these factors justify deeming the warrant pro-
cess to be determinative of the probable cause issue within bounds of plain
error, i.e., so long as official belief in the warrant's legality is not "entirely
unreasonable."
This approach would not nullify the warrant clause, but only acknowl-
edge that the probable cause standard is primarily directed to issuing
judges rather than reviewing courts. In other contexts, appropriate and
neutral procedures have long satisfied the probable cause standard. For
example, an indictment "'fair upon its face,' and returned by a 'properly
constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable
cause and requires issuance of an arrest warrant without further in-
quiry."' 84 Similarly, one arrested pursuant to warrant has no constitu-
tional right to challenge the sufficiency of the warrant application, but
may be compelled to remain in detention until trial,185 because probable
cause "can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing." '
The magistrate's determination of probable cause to search is no less
reliable than her determination of probable cause to arrest. Indeed, the
typical search warrant is both more costly to the police,"1 7 and more thor-
oughly reviewed by the issuing magistrate, 8 ' than is the typical arrest
warrant. And certainly the search warrant process is less of a rubber
stamp for the executive than the "properly constituted grand jury," whose
modern function consists primarily of expanding rather than containing
prosecutorial powers.189
There would remain an important role for subsequent review even
under this reformulation, for in two ways the deterrent influence of the
exclusionary rule is an essential part of the approach. First, the law en-
forcement bureaucracy should understand that to the extent the reliability
of the warrant process declines, its officers act at peril of suppression.
Inquiry into the substance of the probable cause showing would be appro-
priate if, for example, the executive branch abandons established preap-
plication screening practices, or if, because of either judicial abdication or
executive unprofessionalism, the judicial role in the process is nullified.
Thus, in the Wood case, the reviewing court should have reached (and
184. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975) (quoting Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S.
241, 250 (1932)).
185. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125; 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 5.1, at 247 ("Gerstein makes
it clear ... that no such [probable-cause] determination is necessary if the defendant was arrested
with warrant. .. ").
186. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120.
187. See supra text accompanying note 120.
188. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. RoTENBERG, supra note 121, at 119.
189. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 584, 589-90, 586 P.2d 916, 919 (1978);
Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153, 155-56 (1965);
Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 179-80 (1973).
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rejected) the substance of the application after determining that the war-
rant procedure did not merit the deference suggested by the Leon result.
The latter holding could rest either on the complete absence of either ex-
ecutive screening or independent investigation, or on the insufficiency of
the application to "allow [the magistrate] to determine probable cause. °"190
Under such circumstances the reality of the case is a warrantless search
accompanied by a piece of paper, and a substantive inquiry under the
Gates standard becomes appropriate.
Second, in cases in which the warrant process plainly fails-cases like
Wood-maintenance of the exclusionary rule would encourage both police
and magistrates to avoid seeking and issuing plainly illegal warrants.
Even when the procedure in general works well, the exclusionary sanction
can prevent egregious cases from slipping through. In a situation in which
well-trained police would know that the application should never have
been presented without more investigation, retention of the exclusionary
sanction can negate the "incentive to submit it to a magistrate, on the
chance that he may take the bait." ' '
The resulting regime would treat probable cause in warrant cases as
primarily a question for the issuing judge, just as negligence is primarily
an issue for the jury. Such a procedural approach would recognize the
infinite variety of factual circumstances involved in probable cause deter-
minations, and would depend on the total process to serve the overall
objectives of a regulatory scheme rather than to produce consistent results
among cases. 192 Judicial review would remain necessary to safeguard the
190. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. Although this situation is not specifically enumerated as calling for
suppression in the Leon opinion, see 104 S. Ct. at 3421-22, it would seem to follow from two sugges-
tions in that passage of the Court's opinion. First, by indicating that suppression remains appropriate
when the magistrate abandons her detached and neutral role, the Court appears to conclude that the
breakdown of the warrant process justifies retaining the exclusionary sanction. Second, by indirectly
citing Aguilar and Nathanson as examples of when "the magistrate or judge had no business issuing
a warrant," see supra note 139, the Court implies that "bare bones" affidavits are "so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Id. at 3422
(citation omitted).
191. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3454 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Review of this nature would parallel the
checks on other procedures for determining probable cause. The decision to issue an arrest warrant is
subject to all the ultimate protections of the trial process, and indeed habeas corpus after that. See
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27. Searches incident to arrest may be attacked on the basis of the arrest
warrant's inadequacy even when the resulting detention cannot be challenged on the same ground. See
3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 11.4, at 642. Presumably this type of suppression motion is also now
subject to the good-faith exception. But with respect to the fruits of searches authorized directly by a
search warrant or implicitly by an arrest warrant, the procedural determination of probable cause by
the issuing magistrate should remain subject to suppression when the magistrate's judgment was "en-
tirely unreasonable." This does no more than duplicate the Leon rule, under which suppression re-
mains appropriate when the probable cause showing is wholly inadequate. 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
192. The proposed approach thus would spare courts the difficult and ultimately problematic task
of deciding factual probable cause issues as a predicate to the determination that the police conduct
was otherwise reasonable. Indeed, one advantage of treating probable cause as a procedural issue
would be recognition of its essentially factual nature. Professor Grano argues:
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integrity of the procedure, but only within the narrow bounds even the
Leon majority acknowledged to be unavoidable. Such a system would ac-
complish whatever gains for law enforcement the Court hopes Leon will
achieve, would not threaten serious intrusions on legitimate privacy inter-
ests, and would avoid the risk that treating constitutional violations as too
costly to remedy may trivialize the legal status of the Constitution.
C. Warrantless Searches
The possibility exists that the Court may extend the good-faith excep-
tion to warrantless searches. The previous discussion makes clear at least
one good reason for not doing so. Just as treating illegal warrants as no
cause for institutional regret implicitly denies the status of the Fourth
Amendment as law, a good-faith exception for warrantless searches risks
trivializing the Constitution. The jurisprudential objection therefore ap-
plies to any extension of the good-faith exception to warrantless searches.
Moreover, sound analytical and categorical objections apply to exten-
sion of the exception despite their inapplicability in the warrant context.
In the warrantless context, there is not even the pretense that the police
are relying on a superior determination of probable cause; the deterrent
influence of the exclusionary rule is therefore not blunted by authoritative
but erroneous official opinion regarding matters of law. Without a war-
rant there is no judicial determination of the legal issue.
Deterrence considerations accordingly counsel against indulging defer-
ence to police judgment about legality of police action. As for errors about
underlying circumstances, the law already judges the officers' actions by
the facts as they appear at the time and not by what the circumstances are
ultimately proven to be. With probable cause to arrest one Hill, the police
may lawfully arrest one Miller without a warrant provided the police
have a "reasonable, good-faith belief that the arrestee Miller was in fact
Hill." '193 Similarly, the police may rely on statements from victims or
other citizens, plausible on their face, even though the statements turn out
to be inaccurate.19
4
Reasonably cautious people, however, frequently respond to the same facts differently. We
know, for example, that on the same evidence one jury may acquit while another may convict,
but, except in unusual cases, we are prepared to accept either response as reasonable. On
appeal of a jury verdict, the court does not ask whether it would have found the defendant
guilty but only whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty. Applying
this principle to the review of a finding of probable cause, the court should similarly ask only
whether the reasonably cautious person could have concluded that probable cause was present.
Grano, supra note 50, at 507 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 506-12.
193. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971).
194. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 50, § 3.4, at 594 ("The better and modern view. . . is that
as a general proposition any person purporting to be a crime victim or witness may be presumed
reliable, though the police must remain alert to the existence of any circumstances which would make
944
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In only two situations might the police plausibly rely on independent
authorization for the search so as to make a case for applying the good-
faith doctrine. In one situation, the police ask for consent to search the
premises and receive it from someone with apparent, but not actual, au-
thority. The courts currently disagree about this question.195 If a consent
search requires neither a warrant nor probable cause because Fourth
Amendment rights are personal and may be waived-from the atomistic
perspective-then one without actual authority has no commission to sur-
render another's rights. From the regulatory perspective, if a consent
search is legal because the police practice at issue does not threaten legiti-
mate privacy interests in other cases, apparent authority should suffice so
long as the police act reasonably. 96
Applying the good-faith exception to cases of apparent authority would
resolve the issue, but in an unsatisfactory manner. If searches authorized
only by apparent authority are judged to be unreasonable, they ought to
be deterred. 19 7 Conversely, if searches based on apparent authority are
indeed reasonable and ought not to be deterred, the appropriate approach
is to endorse the regulatory view of what the Fourth Amendment forbids.
Justice Traynor, for example, authored both a leading opinion in defense
of the exclusionary rule and a leading opinion endorsing the apparent
authority position.1 98 Rather than recognize another inconsequential
Fourth Amendment violation, the Court should decide the underlying is-
sue of reasonableness.
The other possible basis for police reliance is executive regulation.
Commentators have proposed that when police act in reliance on a consid-
ered and colorably constitutional general regulation, the exclusionary rule
should not apply. 99 In theory this is an attractive proposition, for it
would encourage police rule-making and yet permit the courts to invali-
date prospectively rules that overreach police authority. This proposal,
however, invites the jurisprudential objection in starker form than does
Leon itself. Instead of deferring to police reliance on a judicial error of
law, withholding the exclusionary sanction from police conduct pursuant
that presumption inoperative in a particular case.").
195. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 8.3, at 717-18 n.91.
196. Id. at 716-25.
197. Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court, applying that state's statutory good-faith exception, sup-
pressed the fruits of a search consented to by the landlord but not the tenant, since Colorado law
clearly established the ineffectiveness of the landlord's consent. People v. Brewer, 690 P.2d 860, 864
(Colo. 1984). Only when the law is uncertain about the effectiveness of a particular third-party con-
sent does the Leon logic of nondeterrence apply, and those situations invite retroactivity rather than
generalized good-faith analysis.
198. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905 (1955) (adopting exclusionary rule); People
v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955) (adopting apparent authority doctrine).
199. See Kaplan, supra note 65, at 1050-55; Comment, Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to
the Exclusionary Rule, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1610, 1642-55 (1982).
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to illegal rules would honor police reliance on police judgment. This ap-
pears to nullify substantive constitutional guarantees because the executive
branch has disapproved them. Second, a good-faith exception for police
rules would undermine deterrence. Once the law enforcement bureaucracy
is aware of the exception, its members will know that they can exempt
from the exclusionary rule any police practice whose current legal status
is uncertain. This would encourage writing rules as a hedge against future
court developments, creating a positive incentive to err on the side of un-
constitutional behavior.200
Thus a good-faith exception in warrantless cases cannot follow either
from police reliance on an independent determination of questions of law,
or from the need to allow for reasonable mistakes of fact. All it could
mean is what it condenses to in the warrant context: a further diminution
in the rigor of the probable cause (and, in the warrantless context, the
reasonable suspicion) standards. Applying Leon to warrantless searches
would mean that the judgment of the police that their actions were legal
would be accepted unless the officer's belief was "entirely unreasonable."
From the standpoint of deterrence, this would have two very serious
consequences.
First, a general dilution in existing standards would encourage increas-
ingly speculative search and seizure activity. When the police need not
clear the costly hurdle of the warrant process, knowledge that nothing
short of an entirely unreasonable belief in probable cause will result in
suppression would leave no disincentive to searching and arresting on rea-
sonable suspicion, and to stopping and frisking for no reason at all. If this
effect were slow to come, it would also be inevitable, for we can count on
police bureaucracies to train and reward their officers with an eye to ad-
missible evidence and not to abstract legality.201 A sufficiently energetic
officer, by frisking everyone in a suitably crime-ridden neighborhood,
could build up not only an impressive record of arrests, but indeed an
impressive record of "good arrests."
Second, extending Leon to warrantless searches would undermine de-
terrence by making the warrant process less attractive. 0 2 Leon gives the
police an incentive to demonstrate the probity of a search by undertaking
200. This is not to exclude executive procedures from a role in determining Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. Indeed, I have argued here that executive screening procedures for warrants ought to
bear on the probable-cause determination. But procedures and regulations are different things. To say
that a procedure of proven reliability contributes to a showing of substantive legality is one thing. It is
quite another to say that an executive pronouncement can immunize from consequence a declared
illegality. The latter approach invites overreaching regulations and tolerates unconstitutional executive
actions in a way that the former approach does not.
201. See supra notes 124 & 175.
202. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 5, at 927.
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the costs of the warrant process. In this sense procuring a warrant truly is
a sign of good faith. To treat warrantless cases in the same way would
penalize those police who take the time to seek a warrant. Again the re-
sult would be to encourage "cheap and dirty" searches, searches likely to
require innocent people to expose their private lives to the armed power of
the government.
In addition to sacrificing deterrence, extending Leon to warrantless
searches would strengthen the force of the categorical argument for a right
to judicial review.20 3 In most cases, the possibility of a tort action at least
preserves some forum for review of executive search and seizure activity.
Even in Leon itself, there is the initial judicial check by the issuing magis-
trate. Under the approach I have urged, there would also be review of the
legality of the search, measuring probable cause by the integrity of the
warrant procedure, with suppression remaining available when the proce-
dure plainly fails. But a good-faith exception in warrantless cases would
withdraw judicial scrutiny from a class of executive actions that are con-
cededly illegal. Whatever else might be unchanged in such a world, it
would no longer be "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."20 4
V. "ALL THE DIFFERENCE IN THE WORLD"
I have argued that the unique features of the warrant process largely
negate the risks to individual privacy posed by the Court's holding in
Leon. Indeed, much of the criticism of that decision holds that the good-
faith exception does little more than duplicate current law under the ru-
bric of a new vocabulary.205 If such criticism unfairly refuses to grant the
new doctrine the virtue of its defects,20 8 it also reflects a deep-seated dis-
approval of the majority's attitude toward the Fourth Amendment.
Of course in time bad doctrine will out. If the Court refuses to insist on
those procedural safeguards that have prevented abuse of the warrant pro-
cess, we can expect to see an increasingly speculative and ultimately abu-
sive reliance on warrants. If the Court extends the good-faith doctrine to
203. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
204. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
205. See Kamisar, supra note 4, at 588-89.
206. Professor LaFave points out that Leon's focus on the reasonableness of police reliance on the
magistrate's finding of probable cause increases the deference to magistrates effected by Gates.
LaFave, supra note 5, at 925-26. While doctrinally correct, few cases are likely to fall between the
deferential review of the totality of the circumstances before the magistrate, and the objectively reason-
able reliance of well-trained police. Indeed, in Gates the cases cited by Justice Rehnquist as examples
of when probable cause is lacking, 462 U.S. at 239, are Nathanson and Aguilar, the same cases
Justice White cited as examples of police reliance that is not objectively reasonable. Id. at 264.
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warrantless searches, in spite of the total irrelevance of Leon, we can ex-
pect yet more serious deprivations of individual liberty.
But the Court's attitude is indeed troubling on its own account. Justice
Frankfurter could have had the Leon majority in mind when he wrote:
It makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the
central fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it was a
safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies
as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution, or one thinks of it
as merely a requirement for a piece of paper.
20 7
Put another way, I sincerely doubt that the members of the Leon majority
would have put the Fourth Amendment in the Constitution. What after
all is the point of a law whose observance is a "cost" and whose violation
is "objectively reasonable?"
The judges are entitled to their attitudes, but the people are entitled to
their law. If the law is not supple enough to accommodate circumstance
through interpretation, then the judges' duty is to apply it until the people
come to the judges' wisdom. In this sense, Leon embodies a double failure
in judicial craftsmanship. The Court's refusal to do anything about an
announced violation of the Constitution is more than a betrayal of consti-
tutionalism; it is a gratuitous betrayal as well, for principled if not uncon-
tested interpretations of the Fourth Amendment could achieve the Court's
result without so completely substituting judicial for constitutional values.
As Professor Weinreb has observed, the Fourth Amendment speaks in
magnificent generalities. 208 For the Court to ignore the opportunity for
interpretation makes graphically clear its fundamental antipathy to the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.
Decisions like Leon pose one further danger. As Justice Frankfurter
wrote on another occasion, the "Court's authority-possessed of neither
the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence
in its moral sanction.1 209 I have defended Leon, much as I have in this
Article, to my students in criminal procedure. No other decision generated
as much enduring cynicism about neutral principles and the rule of law.
Strong-willed people in positions of apparently ultimate authority may
not see any harm in disillusioning law students. A stewardly respect for a
noble institution might inspire them to reflect, however, that in the same
sense as is the Fourth Amendment, Article Three and Marbury are only
words on paper.
207. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
208. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 47-50 (1974).
209. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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